Posttraumatic Growth and Disability:  On Happiness, Positivity, and Meaning by HAYWARD, HSIEN
 Posttraumatic Growth and Disability:  On Happiness, Positivity, and
Meaning
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation No citation.
Accessed February 19, 2015 12:20:26 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11156671
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA
  
  
 
 
 
 
Posttraumatic Growth and Disability:  
On Happiness, Positivity, and Meaning 
 
A dissertation presented  
by  
H’Sien Hayward 
to  
The Department of Psychology  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
in the subject of  
Social Psychology 
 
Harvard University  
Cambridge, Massachusetts  
 
February 2013 
 
 
 
 
© 2013 - H’Sien Hayward 
All rights reserved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 iii 
Dissertation Advisors: Professors George Vaillant & Jim Sidanius           H’Sien Hayward 
 
Posttraumatic Growth and Disability: On Happiness, Positivity, and Meaning 
Abstract 
The field of psychology has traditionally focused on the deleterious effects of adversity to 
the exclusion of positive effects. However, a literature on positive sequelae of traumatic events 
has burgeoned over the past decade. The issue of whether individual’s reports of positive 
changes are merely illusory self-enhancing biases or are reflective of objective, quantifiable 
change is perhaps the most contentious in the posttraumatic growth research at this time. This 
dissertation begins with a broad overview of the extant research on posttraumatic growth, then 
presents the evidence supporting each side of the validity debate. As the population studied in 
this dissertation is adults with traumatic-onset spinal cord injuries, a presentation of research that 
ties disability to the posttraumatic growth literature follows. Finally, the introductory chapter 
concludes with an argument for the importance of including a disability perspective in 
psychological science. Three papers follow, each taking up aspects of this relatively new focus 
on positive aspects of disability. 
The first paper lays the foundation for the work that follows by exploring the question of 
whether people with disabilities are, in fact, doing well. Establishing a baseline of subjective 
well-being would seem necessary before venturing into an exploration of how this happiness 
may have come to be. In a replication of a classic study, I find that indeed, people with spinal 
cord injuries report levels of happiness that are equal to both those of controls and lottery 
winners. In the second study, I use experimental and survey evidence collected over a span of 
eight-years to explore posttraumatic growth and its relationship to emotion regulation advances. 
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Finally, Paper 3 takes an in-depth look at one of the critical components of posttraumatic growth, 
a sense of meaning in life, and its relationship to happiness.  
The concluding chapter outlines several limitations of this program of research, and 
provides directions for research that will carry it forward. Finally, it returns to the validity debate 
in the posttraumatic growth literature most broadly, making recommendations for future research 
that will shed light on this issue, and presenting reasons that resolution of this debate is important 
for academia, clinical practice, and society-at-large. 
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Traditionally, the field of psychology has focused on trauma as a precursor to 
psychopathology. There is good reason for this. For most people, in most cases, negative events 
tend to produce negative consequences (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2006). There have been equally 
long traditions however, in the fields of philosophy, literature, and religious studies, of 
considering the ways in which human suffering offers the possibility for significant good. 
Indeed, a central theme of much philosophical inquiry--and the work of novelists, dramatists, and 
poets--has included the possibility of psychological growth from loss (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 
1995). In the 20th century, psychological pioneers like Maslow (1954), Frankl (1963), and 
Yalom (1980), discussed the ways in which critical life crises offered possibilities for positive 
personal change, and in the 1980s several researchers conducted preliminary studies on positive 
psychological outcomes of negative events (Affleck et al., 1987; Cella & Tross, 1986). The 
relatively recent emergence of positive psychology as a field of scientific inquiry has served as a 
catalyst, and both conceptual work and empirical studies on posttraumatic growth (PTG) have 
burgeoned over the past decade.   
This dissertation presents three papers organized loosely around a central theme: The 
potential for positive sequelae following disablement. In this introductory chapter I first provide 
an in-depth description of posttraumatic growth, with special attention paid to the validity of the 
construct. I follow this by presenting an integration of posttraumatic growth and disability, 
before making an argument for the importance of including disability in the study of 
psychological science. Finally, I introduce the three papers presented in this dissertation. 
Overview of Posttraumatic Growth 
A growing number of studies have documented reports of positive changes resulting from 
the psychological struggle with trauma and adversity (e.g., Affeck & Tennen, 1996; Helgeson, 
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Reynolds, & Tomich, 2006; Linley & Joseph, 2004; McMillan, 1999; Park, 1998; Sears, Stanton, 
& Danoff-Burg, 2003; Zoellner & Maercker, 2005). Theoretical models of posttraumatic growth 
are generally based on the idea that major life crises present threats to a person’s fundamental 
assumptions about the self and world (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995; 1996), 
and that the psychological struggle to cope with these threats can result in positive cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioral changes, or, according to models that support the illusory nature of 
PTG, in the perception of these changes.  
Studies have reported growth following a range of adverse events, for example, cancer 
(e.g., Stanton, Bower, & Low, 2006; Collins et al., 1990), HIV (e.g., Ickovics et al., 2004), 
bereavement (e.g., Davis et al., 1998; Polatinsky & Esprey, 2000), accidents and disasters (e.g., 
Joseph et al., 1993; McMillen & Cook, 2003), rape (e.g., Burt & Katz, 1987; Thompson, 2000), 
war and conflict (e.g., Elder & Clipp, 1989; Waysman et al., 2001), and illness and surgery (e.g., 
Affleck et al., 1987; Tennen et al., 1992). In fact, cases of self-reported growth in the aftermath 
of traumatic events outnumber cases of psychiatric disorder by a large margin (Quarantelli, 1985; 
Tedeschi, 1999; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). Only a minority of people exposed to traumatic 
events develop long-standing psychiatric disorders (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004), whereas 
estimates of the prevalence of growth among people who have experienced trauma tend to range 
from sizeable minorities (30%-40%) to majorities (60%-80%) (Linley & Joseph, 2004).  
Positive outcomes following traumatic stressors are generally reported in three domains: 
first, changes in the perception of one’s self, including an appreciation of one’s strength and an 
awareness of new possibilities for one’s life; second, positive changes in the way one relates to 
other people, such as a greater sense of connection to others and greater compassion for others 
who have also suffered; and third, changes in one’s philosophy of life, especially a changed 
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sense of what is most important (often greater importance is given to priorities like spending 
time with family and decreased importance given to financial and materialistic priorities).  
Theoretical Concerns about the Validity of PTG 
Self-Enhancing Cognitive Biases 
 Several prominent theories have been put forth that suggest that PTG reports should not 
be accepted at face value. These theories argue for the widespread tendency to see oneself in an 
overly positive light, particularly when one’s sense of self is threatened. 
 Cognitive Adaptation Theory. According to cognitive adaptation theory (1983; Taylor 
& Brown, 1988), people have general self-enhancing cognitive biases as well as specific self-
protective cognitive biases for seeing positive in highly negative experiences. Taylor posited that 
the process of readjustment after a threatening event focuses on three themes: (a) a search for 
meaning, (b) an attempt to regain mastery over life in general and the event in particular, and (c) 
an attempt to restore self-esteem through self-enhancing evaluations, particularly social 
comparisons. A central tenet of cognitive adaptation theory is the illusory nature of peoples’ 
perceptions: “The individual’s efforts to successfully resolve these three themes rest 
fundamentally upon the ability to form and maintain a set of illusions” (Taylor, 1983; p. 1161).  
“Positive illusions” are not only seen as normative, but as psychologically beneficial.  
 Taylor (1983) found that breast cancer survivors’ attempts at self-enhancement included 
focusing on specific aspects of one’s situation on one which fared well, conducting favorable 
social comparisons (i.e., downward; “I am more compassionate than she is”), and perceiving 
positive personal changes. Many responses made by the women were clearly illusory. For 
example, the vast majority of women reported that they were coping as well as or better than 
others facing the same challenge (Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985).  
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 Temporal Comparison Theory. In a development of social comparison theory 
(Festinger, 1954), Albert (1977) proposed that people also evaluate themselves by comparing 
their current selves to past selves. He suggested that people have both a need to establish a 
coherent sense of identity over time and to perceive progressive improvement in themselves, 
which is achieved by distorting the past and perceiving personal growth. In other words, people 
construct “downward temporal comparisons” (e.g., “I am more compassionate than I used to 
be”).   
McFarland and Alvaro (2000) investigated the impact of self-enhancement motivation on 
the temporal comparisons of people who had experienced challenging life events. Specifically, 
they conducted a series of studies with undergraduate university students to examine whether 
threatened individuals constructed perceptions of personal growth by derogating their past 
attributes. Their findings supported the hypothesis that perceptions of improvement reflect 
illusory or exaggerated thinking that is prompted by threatening self-relevant feelings. First, 
survivors of negative life events were more likely than acquaintances of survivors to perceive 
greater personal growth after traumatic life events than after mildly negative life events. It is 
important to note, however, that this was not a true informant study, as discussed below; rather, 
participants were divided into two groups, the first describing “the most negative life event that 
had happened to them,” the second describing “the most negative life event that had happened to 
an acquaintance (i.e., someone known casually for over 2 years).” Also, survivors in this study 
achieved a sense of self-improvement by derogating their earlier attributes rather than idealizing 
their present attributes.  Second, in contrast to people who were randomly assigned to focus 
temporarily on a mildly negative event, those who focused on a traumatic event reported greater 
self-improvement. Third, increased perceptions of growth were not shared by acquaintances. 
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Finally, people who were led to experience negative self-relevant feelings subsequently reported 
higher levels of personal growth than people who were led to experience more positive feelings, 
which supports a causal link between threat and illusions of self-improvement. 
Coping Strategies 
 Other theorists have argued that perceptions of growth from threatening life events 
represent active attempts to cope with trauma and reduce feelings of distress. Two of the most 
prominent coping theories relevant to PTG are presented below. 
  Positive reappraisal coping.  This coping strategy, also referred to as positive 
reinterpretation, has been described as an individual’s conscious effort to view a negative 
situation in a way that emphasizes its positive aspects (Scheier, Weintraub, & Carver, 1986).  It 
is commonly measured by the Positive Reappraisal Coping subscale (REAPP) of the COPE, a 
60-item questionnaire assessing 15 coping strategies (Carver, Scheirer, & Weintraub, 1989). 
Items on this subscale include: “I try to see it in a different light, to make it seem more positive;” 
“I look for something good in what is happening;” “I try to grow as a person as a result of the 
experience;” and are coded on a scale from 1 = I don’t do this at all to 4 = I do this a lot.  
 Several studies have provided evidence for the relationship between PTG and positive 
reappraisal coping. For example, in a study of 259 people with spinal cord injuries, participants 
who reported high growth showed significantly more use of positive reappraisal coping (p < 
.001) than people who reported either low or medium growth (Znoj, 1999; as discussed in 
Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). Park, Cohen, & Murch (1996) also found a significant positive 
correlation between PTG and positive reappraisal coping (r = .55, p < .01). 
 Defensive denial. Use of a defensive coping style (i.e., presenting oneself in an overly 
positive light and denying the costs of stressful life events) has been proposed as an explanation 
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for PTG. Several studies have assessed this hypothesis. In a study of people affected by the 
SARS outbreak, Cheng et al. (2006) used the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) as a measure of defensiveness, and found that people who reported 
benefits in the absence of costs scored higher on this measure. McMillen and Cook (2003), in a 
study of PTG in people with spinal cord injuries, included a measure of denial coping (a subscale 
of the Situational COPE; Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989) and found that denial was 
positively correlated with the reporting of two positive by-products: increased family closeness 
and material gain (as measured by the Perceived Benefit Scales; McMillen & Fischer, 1998).
 Dohrenwend et al. (2004) investigated reports of PTG in relation to various aspects of 
adjustment in U.S. male veterans of the Vietnam War. Using data from interviews conducted in 
the National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study (NVVRS; Kulka et al., 1990), supplemented 
by data from military records, Dohrenwend and colleagues assessed the severity of exposure to 
war-zone stressors, the valence and salience of appraisals of the impact of their service in 
Vietnam on their present lives, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and other indicators of 
wartime and postwar functioning. Defensive denial was operationalized as mainly positive/high 
salience appraisals of the impact of their service in Vietnam being made despite high rates of 
current PTSD and problems in postwar functioning (as opposed to mainly positive/high salience 
appraisals along with low rates of negative outcomes, or mainly negative/high salience appraisals 
along with high rates of negative outcomes). Indeed, there was a small subgroup of highly 
exposed veterans with current PTSD who also made mainly positive/high salience appraisals and 
therefore appeared to be engaging in some form of defensive denial. Thus, it is likely that for 
some people, reports of PTG are reflective of a defensive coping style rather than veridical 
growth.  
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Posttraumatic Growth Assessment 
 Researchers have explored the phenomenon of posttraumatic growth by using both 
qualitative and quantitative measures. Both types of measures have strong face validity, are easy 
to administer, and are readily accepted by research participants (Tennen & Affleck, 2009). 
However, measures of PTG are not without their flaws, and like all scales that rely on self-report, 
are subject to bias.  
Qualitative Methods 
 Early studies of growth typically used an interview format with open-ended questions 
that asked people how their lives had changed in response to a traumatic event (Park & 
Helgeson, 2006). Interviews often specifically targeted positive life changes resulting from the 
event (Davis et al., 1998). For example, in an early study of perceived benefits following heart 
attack, participants were asked “As difficult as it’s been, have there been any benefits or gains 
that wouldn’t have occurred if you hadn’t experienced the heart attack?” (Affleck, Tennen, 
Croog, & Levine, 1987). Responses to interview questions were usually categorized into 
domains of PTG by post hoc statistical analyses. In the analyses, authors determined whether or 
not there had been any benefit and, in separate analyses, rated the number of reported benefits 
(Zoellner & Maercker, 2006).  
Quantitative Methods 
 The number of instruments that have been published as quantitative measures of PTG is 
steadily growing, with at least 14 in use at the time of this writing. Among these, the 
Posttraumatic Growth Inventory (PTGI; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996) and the Stress-Related 
Growth Scale (SRGS; Park et al., 1996) have undergone the most psychometric development 
(Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). The Posttraumatic Growth Inventory is a 21-item self-report 
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measure comprised of 5 factors: (a) Relating to Others, (b) New Possibilities, (c) Personal 
Strength, (d) Spiritual Change, and (e) Appreciation of Life. Items include “I discovered that I 
was stronger than I thought I was,” and “I developed new interests.” All scale items are 
positively worded, and respondents are asked to indicate the degree to which each change 
occurred as a result of their crisis. A 6-point Likert response scale is used, ranging from 0 = I did 
not experience this change, to 5 = I experienced this change to a very great degre. The Stress-
Related Growth Scale is a 50-item measure reflecting positive changes in three domains: (a) 
relationships with others (e.g., “A prior relationship with another person became more 
meaningful”); (b) personal resources, including life philosophy (e.g., “I learned that I want to 
have some impact on the world”), and (c) coping skills (e.g., “I learned better ways to express 
my feelings”). Individuals are asked to rate the degree to which they experienced each positive 
change on a scale from 0 = not at all, 1 = somewhat, to 2 = a great deal.   
Potential Sources Of Measurement Bias 
 As the vast majority of PTG measures rely on the self-reports of participants, reports of 
growth may be the result of weaknesses of self-report measures in general. It is interesting to 
consider, however, that self-reported negative changes following adversity seem to be accepted 
unanimously (Sumalla, Ochoa, & Blanco, 2009). Indeed, a highly utilized way to assess 
symptoms of psychopathology like depression and anxiety is with self-report measures. We seem 
willing to accept self-reports about negative sequelae as valid, but not those that are positive 
(Peterson, 2009). Nevertheless, several specific questions about the validity of the methods used 
to assess PTG must be answered. 
Social desirability. The PTGI and the SRGS, in tests of their psychometric properties, 
were uncorrelated with measures of social desirability (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996; Park, Cohen, 
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& Murch, 1996). This finding has since been replicated in several studies of PTG (e.g., Smith & 
Cook, 2004; Wild & Paivio, 2003), suggesting that responses to these scales are not motivated, at 
least not entirely, by wishes for self-enhancement. 
Positive response bias. Illusory reports of growth may be the result of specific measures 
that produce false positive reports of growth because of a positive response bias. A primary 
criticism of most of the inventories used to measure positive outcomes of trauma, including the 
PTGI and the SRGS, is that they do not permit respondents to report negative aspects of their 
traumatic experience (Park & Lechner, 2006). This may lead to problems with validity in two 
ways: (a) respondents are not able to report changes about which they are not asked, and (b) 
respondents may be led to report positive changes that they have not actually experienced. 
Further, theories such as Taylor’s cognitive adaptation theory posit that thinking about 
threatening events leads people to use self-enhancing positive illusions. Therefore, when asked to 
think about traumatic life events, people may be more likely to overestimate their growth.  
 To assess this bias, Smith and Cook (2004) used two methods of measuring posttraumatic 
growth with the PTGI in a demographically diverse sample, using an experimental design. 
University students and adults from a superior court jury pool (n = 276) were randomly assigned 
into one of two groups. In the first group, participants were asked to complete the PTGI in 
relation to a specific traumatic event (linked group), the way in which the PTGI is normally 
administered. In the second group, participants were not directed to link their PTGI responses to 
a particular event but rather to think generally about the past 4 years (unlinked group). Analyses 
revealed that reports of PTG were higher in the unlinked condition than in the linked condition, 
particularly in the areas of personal strength and relating to others.  Therefore, the findings of 
Smith and Cook (2004) contradicted notions that current methods of measuring PTG create a 
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positivity bias, and instead showed that respondents may actually underreport growth on growth 
scales.  
 Baker and colleagues (2008) further explored the potential limitation of only allowing 
respondents to report positive sequelae of adverse events. They developed a measure of 
posttraumatic depreciation by mirroring the positive items that comprise the Posttraumatic 
Growth Inventory, i.e., for each of the 21 PTGI items a corresponding negatively worded item 
was created. Three primary findings resulted: (1) both positive and negative changes were 
reported in same domains, (2) growth and depreciation were uncorrelated, and (3) positive 
changes were reported with much greater frequency than were negative changes. These results 
suggest that posttraumatic growth is a unique and important aspect of traumatic experience, not 
merely the opposite end of a continuum. Therefore, measuring positive changes separately from 
those that are negative appears to be justified.  
Inability of Current Measures to Capture PTG 
A more recent concern, raised by Tennen and Affleck (2009) is that current measures 
cannot accurately assess PTG due to people’s inability to perform the necessary complex mental 
operations (viz. recalling personal and interpersonal change, and determining to what changes 
are attributable). Tennen and Affleck cite as examples, respectively, Wilson and Ross’s (2001) 
demonstration that college students cannot accurately recall personal change over a few months, 
Kirkpatrick and Hazan’s (1994) findings that couple’s inaccuracy in recalling interpersonal 
change, and Todd et al.’s (2005) study showing that in contrast to people’s reports that they 
drank alcohol in order to cope with negative affect, the actual association between drinking and 
negative mood measured in real-time was only moderate. To remedy these challenges to the 
validity of PTG, Tennen and Affleck, like other researchers, recommend two general changes. 
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First, they advocate the use of prospective or nearly prospective designs, rather than the cross-
sectional or two-wave longitudinal designs that are used in nearly all current studies (for 
examples of recent prospective studies, see Ransom et al., 2008 and Frazier et al., 2009). Second, 
the authors recommend explicit assessment of both measured growth (actual change) and 
recalled growth (perceived change). In addition to testing whether actual positive changes occur, 
this would require theories of PTG as a positive illusion or coping mechanism to demonstrate 
that these mechanisms actually predict improvements in adjustment to adverse events.  
General Methods Of Validity Assessment 
 A number of studies have explicitly tested the veridicality of posttraumatic growth. The 
following section describes the primary techniques that have been used to explore this topic, and 
the results of these investigations.   
Informant Ratings  
 Self-reported growth tends to be corroborated by others (McMillen & Cook, 2003; Moore 
et al., 2010; Park, Cohen, & Murch, 1996; Weiss, 2002).  In a study of 160 university students, 
Park et al. (1996) compared participants’ responses to the SRGS with those of their friends and 
relatives. Each student completed the SRGS for their most stressful event in the previous 12 
months, rated the event on several dimensions (e.g., initial stressfulness, current stressfulness, 
perceived success in coping), then nominated a friend or relative to complete the scale on their 
behalf. Nominated informants were mailed the SRGS and the student’s written description of the 
stressful event, and were asked to rate the types of changes that they had seen in the students as a 
result of the event described. Informants were also asked to report the length and closeness (i.e., 
not close, close, extremely close) of their relationship with the student, and the source of their 
perceptions about the student’s growth (e.g., personal observation, statements made by the 
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student, or third-party reports). Participants’ mean SRGS scores did not differ from those 
provided by their informants, paired t(67) = .05, ns, and there was a significant positive 
correlation between participant and informant scores r(72) = .21, p < .05. Furthermore, when the 
analysis was limited to informants who reported being “extremely close” to the participants (n = 
57), the correlation increased to r(56) = .31, p < .05.  
 The personal and subtle nature of the type of changes reflected in posttraumatic growth, 
and the degree of intimacy between some students and their informants may have limited the 
correlations obtained by Park et al. (1996). Weiss (2002) addressed these issues by assessing the 
strength of self-informant agreement in women diagnosed with early-stage breast cancer and 
their husbands.  Forty-one women and their husbands completed the PTGI, and the scores were 
positively correlated (r = .51). The greater agreement in assessments of growth may have 
reflected the greater intimacy of marital partners as compared with that of students and their 
friends and relatives (Weinrib et al., 2006).  
 A third study using informant reports adds evidence for the validity of PTG reports. 
McMillen and Cook (2003) assessed PTG in 42 participants with traumatic-onset spinal cord 
injuries 18-36 months post-injury. Posttraumatic growth was measured with the Perceived 
Benefit Scales (PBS; McMillen & Fischer, 1998), which is composed of eight subscales, e.g., 
Increased Self-Efficacy, Increased Faith in People, and Increased Compassion. Participant 
ratings of PTG were compared with those of family members, who had been asked to complete 
the PBS by indicating how well the items described the positive changes that the person with the 
spinal cord injury had experienced.  Mean scores of PTG for spinal cord injured participants 
were not statistically different from their informants for six of the eight positive by-products 
assessed by the PBS. A complication of informant report methodology is the difficulty in 
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determining whether informants are reporting changes that they have actually observed or are 
merely reporting changes that the participants have verbally described to them. Park et al. (1996) 
explored this issue by computing additional participant-informant correlations for the subset of 
students whose informants reported direct observation of positive changes and for the subset of 
SRGS scale items that represented observable changes. Both sets of correlations increased to 
approximately .30; suggesting that informant reports reflect more than participants’ verbal 
descriptions. 
Control or Comparison Groups 
 Several studies have used control or comparison groups to test the validity of self-
reported posttraumatic growth. Tedeschi and Calhoun (1996) tested the construct validity of the 
PTGI by comparing the responses of 54 students who reported experiencing at least one major 
trauma of great severity in the previous year with 64 students who reported none. Since the PTGI 
purports to measure the benefits of traumatic experience, they hypothesized that the group 
reporting more severe traumas would report more benefits. Indeed, this was the case, with 
persons experiencing severe trauma reporting more benefits (M = 83.16, SD = 19.27) than those 
who did not (M = 69.75, SD = 20.47), (F(1,113) = 12.33, p < .001). 
 Cordova, Cunningham, Carlson, & Andrykowski (2001) compared the PTGI responses of 
a group of women who had survived breast cancer with a healthy group of women matched on 
age and education. The group of breast cancer survivors indicated how they had changed in the 
time since diagnosis and the matched controls indicated positive changes that they had 
experienced in the corresponding amount of time. Survivors’ PTGI scores were significantly 
higher. Tomich and Helgeson (2004) also examined breast cancer survivors, by comparing 
matched groups of women with more or less severe diagnoses. Participants who had been 
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diagnosed with more severe disease reported more growth than the group of women with less 
severe disease. Similarly, Tomich, Helgeson, and Nowak Vache (2005) compared women with 
breast cancer with a control group of non-affected women, and found that cancer survivors 
reported growth in a larger number of domains.  
 Frazier and Kaler (2006) conducted studies with matched comparison groups that did not 
produce much support for the validity of PTG. In the first study, individuals who had 
experienced breast cancer (n = 70) did not score higher on measures of growth domains than a 
matched comparison group (n = 70), except for a measure of spirituality. All data was taken from 
a large national sample of midlife adults (the Midlife in the United States Survey, or MIDUS). 
However, this study was not designed to measure PTG so Frazier and Kaler’s findings are drawn 
from available measures (e.g., ratings of personality traits and interpersonal responses to stress), 
which may have limited their ability to detect differences. 
Tests of Discriminant and Convergent Validity 
 An additional concern is that posttraumatic growth is merely an alternate expression of 
another positive psychological construct on which individuals differ, such as optimism, hope, or 
religiosity. This possibility has been explored in a number of studies. Based on low or null 
correlations, most researchers have concluded that it is not (Park & Helgeson, 2006). For 
example, Milam (2006) found that while self-reported increases in spirituality after HIV 
diagnosis predicted slower disease progression in a sample of 412 people followed for an 
average length of 18 months, posttraumatic growth (measured with the PTGI) did not, except for 
Hispanics and those low in optimism (measured with the Life Orientation Test; LOT; Scheier & 
Carver, 1985). In Sears et al.’s (2003) longitudinal study of women with breast cancer, optimism 
(also measured with the LOT) did not predict PTG, either at study entry or at 12-month follow-
  
 15
up. In this same study, hope, measured by Snyder et al.’s Hope Scale (1991), which assesses 
perceived successful goal-directed energy and the ability to generate plans to achieve goals, was 
also uncorrelated with PTG. 
 Tedeschi and Calhoun (1996) assessed the convergent and discriminant validity of the 
PTGI. To detect whether reports of growth were the result of participants’ wishes to present 
socially desirable responses, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960) was administered. The NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1985) was 
administered to examine the relations between perceiving benefits and the personality 
characteristics of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and 
Conscientiousness. Because optimists tend to perceive and emphasize the positive aspects of 
experiences, the Life Orientation Test (LOT) (Scheier & Carver, 1985) was used. Finally, 
because increases in religiosity have been reported, a three-item measure of religious 
participation (Pressman, Lyons, Larson, & Strain, 1990) was included. As predicted, the PTGI 
was unrelated to social desirability, and was positively correlated with optimism (r = .23, p < 
.01) and religious participation (r = .25, p < .01). Also as predicted, the PTGI was moderately 
and positively correlated with extraversion (r = .29, p < .01) and openness (r = .21, p < .01), and 
was not correlated with neuroticism.  
 Park et al. (1996) also conducted several tests of convergent and discriminant validity. As 
predicted, the SRGS was unrelated to social desirability (as measured by a 20-item short form of 
the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale) (r = .00). The SRGS was positively correlated 
with a one-item rating of event-related growth (r = .46, p < .001), initial stressfulness of event (r 
= .18, p < .001), current stressfulness (r = .14, p < .001), and Impact of Event Scale score (r = 
.31, p < .001). 
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 Weinrib, Rothrock, Johnsen, and Lutgendorf (2006) conducted an assessment of the 
construct validity of the PTGI in a sample of 163 community-dwelling women. Participants 
completed the PTGI, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSD), the Profile of 
Mood States—Short Form (POMS-SF), the Psychiatric Epidemiological Research Interview 
(PERI) Life Events scale, and wrote essays about the impact of a stressful life event that were 
coded for growth and depth of processing. Results showed that higher PTGI scores were 
correlated with greater positive mood and greater depth of processing in essays, and that there 
was no relation between reports of growth and negative mood or socially desirable responding. 
Importantly, independent ratings of growth in the essays were associated with higher PTGI 
scores, indicating that people who endorse growth on standardized questionnaires are able to 
describe and elaborate on the nature of growth that has occurred. 
 Frazier and Kaler (2006) found that specific PTG domains (measured by Perceived 
Benefit Scale subscales) assessed in undergraduate students (n = 96) were not uniquely related to 
corresponding measures of well-being (e.g., family closeness, empathy, gratitude). After 
controlling for positive affect, the PBS subscales were not more highly correlated with the 
corresponding well-being measures than to the other well-being measures and in some cases 
were more highly related to measures in other domains (e.g., self-efficacy). However, this study 
may have been limited by well-being measures that did not map precisely  
onto the PBS subscales and events that were not sufficiently stressful to produce PTG.  
Mental and Physical Health Correlates 
Posttraumatic growth has been linked to psychological and physical health, findings that 
are often taken to support the validity of the construct. For example, in a meta-analytic review of 
PTG studies, (Helgeson, Reynolds, & Tomich, 2006), it was found that greater PTG was related 
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to less depression and more positive well-being. Similarly, Algoe and Stanton (2009) report that 
PTG is associated with increases in positive well-being, particularly positive affect. Frazier, 
Conlon, and Glaser (2001) found that women who reported positive changes at both 2 weeks and 
12 months after experiencing sexual assault had lower depressive symptoms than women who 
reported no positive changes at either time.  
Results have consistently shown a positive correlation between objective measures of 
physical health and posttraumatic growth (Bower, Moskowitz, & Epel, 2009). In one of the first 
studies of this relationship, Affleck, Tennen, Croog, and Levine (1987) found that PTG in men 7 
weeks after a heart attack predicted lower incidence of a second heart attack and lower morbidity 
8 years later. Subsequent studies of individuals with HIV have found positive effects of PTG on 
physiological systems. For example, Bowers, Kemeny, Taylor, and Fahey (1998) found that 
greater incidence of PTG in HIV-positive men 4 days to 18 months after the AIDS-related death 
of a close friend or partner predicted decreased immune system decline (CD4 counts) 2-3 years 
post-bereavement and lower AIDS-related mortality 7 years later. Studies with cancer survivors 
have found decreases in cortisol and increases in aspects of immune function for those who 
found benefits from their experiences (McGregor & Antoni, 2009). In an experimental study that 
assigned women with breast cancer to either write about positive aspects of or facts about their 
experience found that those who wrote about benefits had fewer subsequent medical 
appointments for cancer-related problems (Stanton et al., 2002).  
Neurological Measures 
 Although not expressly designed to test the validity of PTG, Rabe, Zollner, Maercker, 
and Karl (2006) conducted a study that found neurological correlates of PTG in people who had 
been in serious accidents. Eighty-two survivors of severe motor vehicle accidents completed the 
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PTGI, a measure of trait and state affect (PANAS), diagnostic interviews assessing clinical 
disorders, and measurement of electroencephalographic activity.  Models of brain asymmetry 
and emotion propose that left-hemisphere regions of the prefrontal cortex are involved in 
positive emotion and approach-related behavior, and studies have found greater relative left-
sided activity to be associated with well-being and positive affective style (Rabe et al., 2006). As 
predicted, a significant positive correlation was found between greater perceived PTG and 
greater relative left-sided fronto-central activity (as indexed by EEG alpha power asymmetry), (r 
= .34, p <.001). The correlation with PTG remained significant even when trait positive affect 
was statistically controlled.  
The State of the Science 
Although much remains to be learned about the validity of posttraumatic growth, the 
extant research has shed considerable light on this contentious issue. Research has demonstrated 
that perceptions of growth result in part from the derogation of one’s past attributes and reflect a 
normative tendency for self-enhancement (e.g., McFarland & Alvaro, 2000; Taylor, 1983). Other 
research suggests that reports of PTG reflect actual, verifiable change (Park, Cohen, & Murch, 
1996; Weiss, 2002). Further, the evidence suggests that different conceptualizations of PTG (i.e., 
coping process versus outcome) represent related, but distinct, constructs.  
 Posttraumatic growth may be both real and illusory. Dohrenwend et al. (2004), describe 
the conclusions of Sledge and his colleagues (1980) after examining US Air Force pilots and 
navigators who had been held captive during the Vietnam War. There appeared to be two distinct 
groups of survivors. “The researchers were impressed by the veterans' reports of positive 
personal benefits from their captivity and felt that these appraisals served two very different 
functions for different veterans:  [Sledge et al. observed that] ‘For some POWs, the sense of 
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having been changed favorably by captivity is clearly a defensive maneuver aimed at denying a 
deeper sense of having been impaired, both physically (some do have enduring disabilities) and 
psychologically (in terms of mental functioning).’ By contrast: ‘[O]ther POWs … have 
approached their lives with a new set of values concerning work, family, and relationships with 
others, and insist that they are wiser, more content, and know themselves and their environment 
better. They responded to the challenge of captivity as an opportunity to experience their human 
limits, and they defined their abilities and limitations more sharply than most people ever will.’ 
(pp. 430-431).”  For one group of participants, reports of positive growth outcomes appeared to 
be authentic, for the other, illusory. 
 Tennen and Affleck (1998) differentiated between coping by searching for evidence of 
benefits (benefit finding), coping by consciously reminding oneself of perceived benefits (benefit 
reminding), and concluding that one has indeed experienced benefits from a negative life event. 
Similarly, Zoellner and Maercker (2006) in their review of PTG studies, concluded “The 
presentation of different concepts for the phenomenon of PTG has artificially opposed PTG as a 
coping strategy to PTG as an outcome of coping. However, many theorists acknowledge that 
posttraumatic growth can be both, coping style and coping outcome, and that these two modes 
can include differentially adaptive proportions (p. 631).”  Findings from Frazier et al. (2009) 
support the general conclusion that perceived and actual growth reflect different processes. In a 
study of undergraduates that assessed pre- and post-trauma reports of PTG, perceived growth 
was associated with increased distress, whereas actual growth was related to decreased distress.  
 In one of the most rigorous tests of this idea, a longitudinal study of women with breast 
cancer, Sears, Stanton, and Danoff-Burg (2003) differentiated between positive reappraisal 
coping (“the intentional and repeated use of benefit-related information as a coping strategy”) 
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measured with the REAPP, and benefit finding (“the simple identification of benefit [from 
adversity])” measured by the question “Have there been any benefits that have resulted from 
your experience with breast cancer?” finding the two constructs to have distinct predictors and 
outcomes. They further differentiated the predictors and outcomes of PTG (measured by the 
PTGI) from both benefit-finding and positive reappraisal coping. Demographic, personality, and 
stressor-related characteristics predicted different constructs.  For example, education and 
optimism uniquely predicted benefit finding at study entry, hope uniquely predicted positive 
reappraisal coping, and time since diagnosis and perceived stress uniquely predicted PTG at 12 
months. Further, positive reappraisal coping—but not benefit finding—at study entry predicted 
better perceived physical health and more positive mood at 3 and 6 months and PTG at 12 
months.   
 In one of the few prospective studies of PTG, Ransom, Sheldon, and Jacobsen (2008) 
measured reports of personal goals and positive attributes of patients before and after 
radiotherapy for breast or prostate cancer. In the Time 2 assessment, posttraumatic growth was 
assessed with the PTGI. Ransom and colleagues found that PTG was significantly related to 
perceived increases (but not actual increases) in positive attributes and actual increases (but not 
perceived increases) in the relative importance of intrinsic versus extrinsic goals. Further, the 
measures were not unrelated to one another, suggesting that actual positive change and memory 
biases independently contribute to self-reported PTG. Therefore, rather than asking if 
posttraumatic growth is illusory or veridical, a better question may be when is PTG illusory and 
when is it veridical. 
 Variations in whether reported PTG is beneficial, and when it is illusory or veridical, may 
depend on characteristics of the individual (e.g., demographic variables like sex, ethnicity, and 
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age, or personality attributes like optimism and extraversion), stressor characteristics (time since 
event, severity), cognitive processes (control and threat appraisals; optimistic versus pessimistic 
explanatory style), features of the particular domain of PTG (e.g., changed philosophy of life, 
improved relationships, or reordered priorities), or some combination of these features. For 
example, demographic variables like ethnicity may affect the authenticity of growth because the 
notion of growth from adversity can be construed in different ways in different cultures. Gunty et 
al. (2010), in a recent moderator analysis of PTG, found that reports of less distress and greater 
life satisfaction determined those individuals for whom perceived growth was most strongly 
related to actual growth. These findings support the idea that PTG can be both veridical and 
illusory for different people, and adds the promising possibility that this difference can be 
detected.  
Disability and Posttraumatic Growth 
Research regarding the impact of disability and other forms of health-related adversity, like 
the majority of research on trauma outcomes, stresses loss. Traditional theories of disability 
emphasize loss and decline, and common stereotypes of living with physical challenges are 
largely negative (Wright, 1983). While these events often do produce predictable maladaptive 
responses that foster further problems (e.g., chronic depression), particularly in the early stages, 
there is also evidence in the literature that indicates otherwise. For example, a number of 
researchers have documented that people with a severe chronic illness report a level of quality of 
life (QOL) neither inferior nor better than that of less severely ill patients or healthy people 
(Cassileth et al., 1984), and even patients with a life-threatening disease or disability were found 
to report a stable QOL (Andrykowski, Brady, & Hunt, 1993).  Additionally, health care 
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providers and significant others tend to underestimate patients’ level of contentment as compared 
to patients’ reports of their own level of contentment (Sprangers & Aaronson, 1992).  
              Spinal cord injury (SCI), a disability acquired through traumatic onset, and focused on 
in the studies that follow, has received increased attention in recent years as a significant portion 
of the American population has been impacted. Schulz and Decker (1985), in a study of adults 
with SCI, found that despite the obvious impact their injuries had on them, participants saw 
themselves on average as being better off than most people, with or without a disability. Diener 
& Diener (1996) reviewed studies that indicated that all American socioeconomic groups score 
above neutral life satisfaction, as do people with this severe disability.  Finally, Silver (1982) 
reported that individuals with SCI were very unhappy immediately following their injury, but 
that 58% stated that happiness was their strongest emotion by the third week after their injuries.   
Janoff-Bulman & Berger (2000) pointed out that people do not make such changes "in 
spite of their losses and sense of vulnerability, but because of them" (p. 39). From this 
perspective it seems reasonable to look at the ways that disability may create conditions that 
foster coping and personal growth. Rather than being a universally negative experience, 
disability may deepen individuals’ understanding of life and be interpreted positively. Thus, 
reports of increased depression and greater awareness of death do not necessarily contradict 
reports of increased appreciation of life.  Rather, mature schemas may be more complex and 
contain multiple, once seemingly exclusive, views simultaneously.  Indeed, research on the 
complexity of schemas suggests that mature schemas are more complex than immature schemas 
(Linville, 1982, 1987; Linville & Jones, 1980). Likewise, Tedeschi & Calhoun (1995) refer to 
this product of posttraumatic growth as wisdom, and describe it as an appreciation for paradox.  
Collins, Taylor, and Skokan (1990) asked 55 cancer patients about the changes in their lives, and 
  
 23
their findings exemplify this phenomenon.  The patients reported negative changes in their views 
of their world and themselves, while at the same time they reinterpreted their experiences 
positively (perceived benefits, reordered priorities).  
Importance of Disability Research 
Scientific psychology has long aspired to be universalistic. Many researchers have 
worked to discover principles of behavior applicable to all of humanity. Unfortunately, it has not 
turned out to be so easy.  Cognitive mechanisms and social responses thought to be basic 
processes of human functioning have turned out to be culturally variable and context-dependent.  
Though the similarities are often greater than the differences, the variables of ethnicity, gender, 
and age, among others, matter.  
Included among these important variables is disability. Why is it so important to include 
a disability perspective in the science of psychology? First, disability is not the experience of a 
minority of people. Either due to a personal condition or that of a loved one, it is an experience 
that will touch most people at some point during their lives. Second, the aging of the “baby 
boomer” generation will result in unprecedented numbers of people with disabilities living in the 
nation. This vast demographic change will have ramifications for all aspects of society.  Third, 
significant economic, political, and social challenges remain for people with disabilities in 
achieving full inclusion and integration. However, despite the increasing prevalence of people 
with disabilities and the challenges they face, remarkably little empirical research exists 
regarding the cognitive and emotional impact of disability across the lifespan. Psychological 
scientists are in a unique position to research, understand, and address the issues that this large 
and diverse segment of our society experiences.  
Largest Minority 
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Due to post World War II advances in life expectancy and survivorship, individuals 
living with disabilities, regardless of which definition is used, now comprise the single largest 
minority group ever identified in the United States (Campbell, 1996a; Campbell, 1996b). In fact, 
disability is truly an “equal opportunity minority;” anyone can join, at any time, regardless of 
ethnicity, age, gender, or socioeconomic status. 
Today, a full 20 percent of the U.S. population, or over 54 million Americans, live with 
disabilities (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2006). Half of these are severe 
disabilities, affecting the ability to perform basic life functions, such as walking, seeing, or 
hearing (CDC; Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS], 2001). The numbers for 
spinal cord injuries alone are staggering: more than 250,000 spinal cord-injured individuals are 
now living in the United States, and another person joins their ranks every hour of every day 
(Buoniconti Fund to Cure Paralysis, 1995). In addition, there are over 25 million family 
caregivers and millions more who provide aid and assistance to people with disabilities (DHHS, 
2001). 
Add chronic, disabling illnesses to the equation, including the one million children with 
juvenile diabetes, 8.2 million people with cancer, 4 million with Alzheimer's, 60 million people 
with heart disease, 10 million people battling osteoporosis, 43 million living with arthritis, and 
30,000 people with Lou Gehrig's disease (Langevin, 2001), and it is hard to imagine that anyone 
is left untouched by the experience of disability.  
Shifting Demographics  
On the horizon are the anticipated effects of the aging of the “baby boomer” generation, 
those born between 1946 and 1964, which will result in unprecedented numbers of people with 
disabilities (Administration on Aging, 2001; Campbell, 1996b). According to the new National 
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Coalition on Disability and Aging, there are approximately 75 to 85 million Americans -- or one-
third of the nation -- who are aging with long-term disabilities or aging into disability for the first 
time in later life (Campbell, 1996b).  Moreover, as the population ages, more Americans will 
have illnesses and chronic conditions that limit their ability to carry out ordinary tasks, such as 
bathing, rising from a chair, opening a window, and walking to the grocery store. The proportion 
of older adults needing personal assistance with everyday activities increases with age, from 9 
percent of those aged 65-69 up to 50 percent of those aged 85 or older.  With a current life 
expectancy of 75 years, newborns today can expect to experience an average of 13 years with an 
activity limitation (Administration on Aging, 2001). Because the 85-plus group is the fastest 
growing segment of the population, many Americans may live with activity limitations for 20 
years or more.  
Despite the increasing prevalence, little research exists describing the process of aging 
with disability. In fact, data on aging are typically missing from most empirical studies of life-
long disability. At a theoretical level, we need more knowledge of the changing nature and 
meaning of disability at different stages of the life course and across different social contexts. It 
is becoming a priority to incorporate concepts from both gerontology and disability studies into 
cross-disability and cross-cohort research on aging with and aging into disability in mid- to later-
life.  Theoretically integrated and collaborative research strengthens ties between these areas by 
equipping members of both research communities with the data needed to improve the quality of 
life for people of all ages with disability.  
Significant Challenges 
Though progress has been made in the twenty-two years since Congress passed the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), significant challenges remain for people with 
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disabilities in achieving full inclusion and social integration.  Surveys by the National 
Organization on Disability (NOD, 2004; DHHS, 2001) have highlighted these persistent 
obstacles:   
•Americans with disabilities have a lower level of educational attainment than those 
without disabilities (one out of five adults with disabilities has not graduated from high school, 
compared to less than one of ten adults without disabilities). 
•Americans with disabilities are poorer and more likely to be unemployed than those 
without disabilities (unemployment rates for working-age adults with disabilities have remained 
at the 70 percent level for the past 30-plus years). 
•Many Americans with disabilities remain outside the economic and social mainstream of 
American life (71 percent of people without disabilities own homes, but fewer than 10 percent of 
those with disabilities do; and people with disabilities vote at a rate that is 20 percent below 
voters without disabilities, partially due to inaccessible polling places -- the most recent Federal 
Election Commission report states that at least 20,000 of the Nation’s polling places are 
inaccessible to people with disabilities). 
During his term as President of the American Psychological Society, John Darley (2001) 
outlined some objectives for increasing the impact of psychology’s role in informing public 
policy. Important among these is a forward gaze allowing us to predict shifts in our world that 
likely will surface on the pubic policy agenda. Given the vast demographic shift to a more senior 
population with a higher percentage of individuals with disabilities, paired with the significant 
obstacles to living with a disability now, disability issues seem a good place to put one’s energy.  
Currently, the published literature in this area is surprisingly limited, particularly given the 
magnitude and potential costs of the needed federal policies.  
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The Present Research 
The following three papers tie together and extend the literatures on posttraumatic growth 
and disability, focusing specifically on happiness, the positivity effect, and meaning. First, I 
establish that people with disabilities are, in fact, happy. This is crucial to setting the stage for the 
papers that follow. Without a foundational exploration of the well-being of people with 
disabilities, it would seem unnecessary to pursue an analysis of components of posttraumatic 
growth, namely emotion regulation via the positivity effect and the role of a sense of meaning in 
life. I conclude by summarizing the research presented in this dissertation, discussing several 
important limitations, and presenting fruitful areas for future research.  
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Abstract 
Adaptation level theory contends that the impact of extreme events will be attenuated by 
the processes of contrast and habituation, and individuals will eventually return to their pre-event 
levels of happiness.  A classic study by Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978), which 
compared the subjective happiness of lottery winners, controls, and individuals with spinal cord 
injuries, is often used as evidence in support of this contention. However, only partial support for 
the theory was found. Brickman et al. demonstrated that lottery winners were not happier than 
controls, but that people with spinal cord injuries were significantly less happy than winners and 
controls. In Study 1 of the present research, Brickman et al.’s study was repeated, with a critical 
modification: the average number of years elapsed since the paralyzed participants’ injuries was 
extended from 1 to 19. With this adjustment, no differences in happiness levels between the three 
groups were found. These results persisted when gender, age, education, race/ethnicity, 
religiosity, and marital status were taken into account. Study 2 indicated that these null findings 
were not due to the particular measures used nor the use of a hedonic, as opposed to eudaimonic, 
conceptualization of well-being. The results are discussed with respect to their theoretical and 
practical implications.  
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Lottery winners and accident survivors: Happiness is relative 
In a classic study entitled, “Lottery winners and accident victims: Is happiness relative?”  
Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978) presented dramatic evidence that both extremely 
positive and extremely negative events have a relatively weak relation to happiness. Brickman 
and colleagues found that lottery winners were not happier than non-winners, and individuals 
who had sustained traumatic-onset paralysis scored above neutral on measures of general 
happiness and daily pleasures. That is, lottery winners were not particularly happy and accident 
survivors were not particularly sad.  
This provocative and counterintuitive finding led the Brickman et al. (1978) paper to 
become the “most famous article in the psychological literature on wellbeing” (Schkade & 
Kahneman, 1998). However, it may also be one of the most misinterpreted articles. Although it 
is often cited as providing strong evidence for adaptation to even extreme events, the findings of 
Brickman et al. were actually mixed (Diener, Lucas, & Scollon, 2006a; Easterlin, 2003; 
Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999; Lucas, 2007a). Lottery winners were indeed no happier than 
non-winners, but what is often not reported is that people with paralysis were significantly less 
happy than people in the other groups. This effect was quite large; when Diener and colleagues 
(2006) calculated the effect size of the comparison they found that the average control participant 
was happier than 78% of spinal cord injured participants.  
Despite its influence on the field and frequent citation, in the approximately three-
decades since its publication, this study has never been replicated nor its methodological 
weaknesses addressed. The aim of the present research is to conduct a more rigorous test of 
Brickman et al.’s (1978) findings and to investigate related questions regarding hedonic 
adaptation. 
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Hedonic Adaptation 
Adaptation level theory posits that the value of a given reward is not absolute, but is 
relative to the other rewards with which it is compared (Brickman & Campbell, 1971; Helson, 
1964). Interpreted within the framework of this theory, Brickman and colleagues (1971; 1978) 
posited that there are two factors that work to mitigate the impact of extreme events, contrast and 
habituation. In contrast to an extremely positive event, daily activities that were once 
experienced as pleasurable will lose their appeal, and in the long run, the initial thrill of the event 
will dissipate as individuals habituate to their good fortune. Adaptation level theory also predicts 
that the same processes will hold true for extremely negative events. In contrast to the anchor of 
the adverse event, happiness derived from daily pleasures will be enhanced. Over time, as 
individuals become accustomed to the challenge, the process of habituation will erode their 
unhappiness. If all of these suppositions are true, and happiness following extremes of good and 
bad fortune differ little, then it could be concluded that happiness is entirely relative.  
A formulation of this theory, the set-point model, holds that due to inborn personality 
traits, happiness fluctuates around a genetically determined set point that is largely resistant to 
change (e.g., Headey & Wearing, 1989, 1992). A considerable amount of empirical evidence has 
supported this claim. Recent reviews have revealed that 30 to 40% of the variance in happiness 
remains stable over at least 20 years (Lucas, 2007b). Further studies have demonstrated that all 
demographic variables taken together account for only about 20% of variance in happiness 
(Campbell, Converse, & Rodgers, 1976; Diener et al., 2006; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). 
Even factors commonly assumed to be strongly related to happiness, such as health and beauty, 
correlate only weakly with reports of well-being (Diener, Wolsic, & Fujita, 1995; Okun & 
George, 1984).  
  
 32
Does Money Buy Happiness? 
 When it comes to happiness, surely money matters? In general, research has 
demonstrated a remarkably small association between wealth and happiness. Diener, Sandvik, 
Seidlitz, and Diener (1993) found that the correlation between subjective well-being and income 
in the United States was only .13. Even the richest Americans (those with annual earnings of 
above $10 million), were found to be only trivially happier than their less wealthy peers (Diener, 
Horwitz, & Emmons, 1985). Within the United States, where personal income has nearly tripled 
in the last century, average happiness has not increased (Easterlin, 1974; Easterlin, McVey, 
Switek, Sawangfa, & Zweig, 2010). Although there is a moderately strong correlation between 
wealth and well-being between countries (Diener et al., 1993), wealth per se is not driving this 
association. In a study of 100 thousand people from 45 countries with widely varying per capita 
income levels, happiness and income were strongly correlated. However, when human rights 
were controlled for, this association was eliminated (Diener, Diener, & Diener, 1995). More 
recently, Kahneman and Deaton (2010) added an important nuance to the money-happiness 
relationship research. The researchers reviewed surveys of 450,000 Americans and found that 
emotional well-being ceased to increase after individuals reached an annual income of $75 
thousand. However, when respondents were asked how well they thought their lives were going, 
life satisfaction continued to increase with income. (I will return to the issue of separable 
components of happiness in more detail in Study 2.) 
Performing a persuasive test of the relation between money and happiness is difficult 
however, due to the stringent requirements for constructing an ideal data set, most notably the 
lack of random assignment of money among individuals (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2002; 
Gardner & Oswald, 2007). Studying lottery winners, therefore, offers a particularly compelling 
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test of this relationship. In the small number of studies that have examined the happiness of 
lottery winners, results are mixed. In a longitudinal study of 137 lottery winners drawn from a 
panel of randomly chosen people in the United Kingdom, Gardner & Oswald (2001) found that 
those who received windfalls had higher well-being and lower mental stress in the following 
year. A win of approximately $75,000 was associated with a rise in well-being of 0.1 to 0.3 
standard deviations (therefore about 1.5 million dollars would be needed to move someone from 
the bottom to the top of a well-being frequency distribution). In comparison to those with no 
wins and those with small wins, Gardner and Oswald (2007) found that individuals who had 
medium-sized wins (approximately US $1,500 to $170,000), went on to eventually show 
significantly better psychological health. However, in a study of UK National Lottery (1999) 
winners, the size of the win did not affect the happiness of the winner. Those who won 
approximately $70 thousand to $230 thousand were as likely to be happier following their win as 
were those who won more than $1.5 million. In this study, a little over half (55%) of winners 
claimed to be happier than they were before after winning. Forty-three percent responded that 
they were about the same (largely due to the fact that they were happy before their win), and 2% 
reported that they were less happy. Neither of these studies assessed whether gains in well-being 
dissipated many years after the win however, the question that is crucial to studies of hedonic 
adaptation. 
Happiness After Adversity 
For most people, in most cases, negative events tend to produce negative consequences. 
However, both theoretical work and empirical studies of positive sequelae of negative events 
have burgeoned over the past two decades. Studies have reported benefits following a range of 
adverse events, for example, cancer (e.g., Collins, Taylor, & Skokan, 1990; Stanton, Bower, & 
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Low, 2006), HIV (e.g., Ickovics et al., 2004), bereavement (e.g., Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Larson, 1998; Polatinsky & Esprey, 2000), accidents and disasters (e.g., Joseph, Williams, & 
Yule, 1993; McMillen & Cook, 2003), rape (e.g., Burt & Katz, 1987; Thompson, 2000), war and 
conflict (e.g., Elder & Clipp, 1989; Waysman, Schwarzwald, & Solomon, 2001), and illness and 
surgery (e.g., Affleck, Tennen, Croog, & Levine, 1987; Tennen, Affleck, Urrows, Higgins, & 
Mendola, 1992). In fact, cases of self-reported growth in the aftermath of traumatic events 
outnumber cases of psychiatric disorder by a large margin (Quarantelli, 1985; Tedeschi, 1999; 
Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). Only a minority of people exposed to traumatic events develop 
long-standing psychiatric disorders (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004), whereas estimates of the 
prevalence of growth among people who have experienced trauma tend to range from sizeable 
minorities (30%-40%) to majorities (60%-80%) (Linley & Joseph, 2004). 
Furthermore, high levels of well-being and adaptation have consistently been found in 
diverse populations facing extreme adversity. Frederick and Lowenstein (1999) reviewed studies 
of individuals who are incarcerated, finding substantial adaptation following a stressful initial 
period of adjustment (Flanagan, 1980; MacKenzie & Goodstein, 1985; Wormith, 1984; Zamble, 
1992), and even soldiers placed in solitary confinement during the Vietnam war showed high 
levels of adaptation (Suedfeld, Ramirez, Deaton, & Baker-Brown, 1982). Further, people 
encountering health-related adversity and disability generally show levels of well-being that are 
high, and often not different from controls. For example, Riis et al. (2005) found evidence of 
hedonic adaptation to hemodialysis; patients were no less happy than healthy people. Patterson 
and colleagues (1993) reviewed studies of survivors of severe burn injuries one year after the 
accident and found high levels of psychosocial adaptation. Tyc (1992) reviewed empirical 
studies of young adults who had lost limbs due to cancer and found high quality of life and low 
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psychiatric symptoms. Andrykowski, Brady, and Hunt (1993) found that patients with a life-
threatening disease or disability reported a stable quality of life (QOL), and other researchers 
found that individuals with a severe chronic illness reported a level of QOL that was not inferior 
to that of less severely ill patients or healthy people (Cassileth et al., 1984). 
In the specific case of spinal cord injury, Silver (1983) found that although people who 
had sustained paralysis reported strong negative emotions 1 week after their accidents, only 7 
weeks later they reported that their strongest emotion was happiness. Schulz & Decker (1985) 
studied adults with spinal cord injuries and found that participants saw themselves on average as 
being better off than most people, with or without a disability. In addition, Wortman and Silver 
(1987) found that people with tetraplegia reported negative affect levels similar to those of 
control participants. Further, in a study of people with high-level tetraplegia (lesions at C4 or 
above), 92% of participants reported that they were glad to be alive and 86% of the group 
reported that they enjoyed an average or better than average quality of life (Gerhart, Koziol-
McLain, Lowenstein, & Whiteneck, 1994).  
Revisiting the Hedonic Treadmill 
More recent research concerning people who have experienced adversity has 
accumulated, some of which contradicts the assumption of ubiquitous and complete adaptation to 
adverse change, such as unemployment and divorce (Lucas, 2005; Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, & 
Diener, 2004). The rehabilitation literature also reveals mixed results regarding subjective well-
being. Dijkers (1997, 1999) reviewed studies of the life satisfaction of individuals with spinal 
cord injuries, finding that life satisfaction scores are lower than those of people without 
disabilities. In a large study of individuals who had applied for government benefits due to 
disability-induced inability to work, satisfaction with life had declined more than a standard 
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deviation from that reported before the disabling event (Lucas, 2007a). Lucas concluded that 
adaptation does not occur in the case of long-term disability. Taking the divorce, unemployment, 
and disability findings together, Lucas drew a number of conclusions, including, “happiness 
levels do change, adaptation is not inevitable, and life events do matter” (2007a; p. 78).  
Rationale for the Current Studies 
Why the discrepancy? As there are substantial bodies of research that both support and 
refute the hedonic treadmill hypothesis, it remains unclear whether the set-point model 
accurately captures the phenomenon of adaptation. In attempting to unravel this discrepancy, as 
Brickman et al.’s 1978 study is the original study from which much of the other adaptation 
research was inspired, it seemed to make sense to start at the beginning. In the current series of 
studies, I twice attempt to replicate the findings of Brickman et al., and to extend previous 
research on adaptation in several substantive and methodological ways. Accordingly, in the 
studies to be presented here, the sample sizes have been increased, the minimum threshold of 
lottery winnings raised, potential confounding variables included, and the amount of time 
elapsed since the critical event extended.  
The latter modification is perhaps the most important. Time since event has repeatedly 
been found to relate to adaptation trajectories, and to differ depending on the valence of the 
event. In general, hedonic adaptation is more rapid for gains than for losses (Strahilevitz & 
Loewenstein, 1998). For example, in a 15-year longitudinal study of reactions to changes in 
marital status, Lucas and colleagues (2003) found that although people adapt quickly to 
marriage, widowed individuals took almost 8 years to return close to their initial baseline levels 
of happiness. Lundqvist et al. (1991) and Dijkers (1999) found that life satisfaction for people 
with spinal cord injuries improves with increased time since injury. Similarly, Oswald & 
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Powdthavee (2008) find that average life satisfaction drops after the onset of a moderate 
disability, but fully recovers to the predisability level after two years. In a recent prospective 
longitudinal study of 479 males who had acquired long-term work-limiting disabilities, results 
demonstrated that although participants exhibited reduced life satisfaction at the onset of 
disability, after 6 years, there were no differences between people with and without disabilities 
(Pagán-Rodríguez, 2010).  
In that the participants in the current studies were on average two decades post-injury and 
one decade post-winning, these studies contribute an important modification to Brickman et al., 
(1978), in which participants were selected to be no more than 1-year post-event. In fact, 
Brickman and colleagues noted in discussing the limitations of their study that their 
“interpretation would be vastly strengthened, however, if our sample had included people in 
the… equally critical many years after the event, for whom habituation should be complete” 
(1978; p. 924). Therefore, in the current studies I corrected this limitation, postulating that 
increased time since injury or winning would foster greater adaptation. 
Study 2 explores important differences in the measurement and conceptualization of 
happiness. Most cross-sectional survey research and the extant longitudinal studies of disability 
adaptation (Lucas, 2007a; Oswald & Powdthavee, 2008; Pagán-Rodríguez, 2010) have employed 
single items to assess happiness (Diener & Deiner, 1996). However, much research has found 
that happiness can be deconstructed into multiple components that may or may not be correlated 
(Diener, Lucas, & Scollon. 2006). Study 2 uses multiple multi-item measures that are widely 
used and psychometrically validated, thus allowing comparison with other populations and 
examination of different components of subjective well-being.  
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An important distinction in the conceptualization of happiness, drawn from competing 
philosophical traditions, has emerged in the literature. Hedonic well-being focuses on 
maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. In contrast, eudaimonic well-being holds that true 
happiness entails identifying, cultivating, and living in accordance with ones virtues (Aristotle, 
trans. 1985). Although measures of hedonia and eudiamonia are correlated, the constructs also 
have important differences. The extant research on adaptation, however, does not often make this 
distinction. In Study 2, both hedonic and eudaimonic measures are included to explore the 
relation between adaptation and these two models of happiness.  
Study 1 
Study 1 examined the central hypothesis that increased the time since the critical event 
would produce evidence of complete hedonic adaptation. Like in the Brickman et al. (1978) 
study, lottery winners were not predicted to be happier than controls. In contrast to the Brickman 
et al. study and to the recent work by Lucas (2007a), however, it was predicted that there would 
no longer be significant differences between the happiness ratings of people with disabilities and 
controls or lottery winners. Therefore, I predicted that this study would support the set-point 
model of happiness and the idea of a hedonic treadmill.  
Method 
Participants  
Lottery winners.  The first fifty-two participants who had won at least $1 million in the 
lottery and responded to recruiting letters mailed by the Executive Directors of the New York 
(approximately 1,400 letters were mailed) and Massachusetts State Lotteries (188 letters were 
mailed) were included. Data from 2 participants were excluded as they completed less than 10% 
of the survey questions, providing a final sample of 50 lottery winners. The letters directed 
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interested participants to a web address for an online survey. Minimum amount won was 
increased to $1 million from the $50,000 threshold used in Brickman et al. (1978) to satisfy 
criticism that the null findings had been due to the small size of the lottery winnings. Indeed, 
previous research with lottery winners has shown that well-being increases and mental stress 
decreases with the amount of the windfall (Gardner & Oswald, 2001). As with all groups, the 
online survey was closed when the desired sample size was reached; thus it is not possible to 
calculate response rates. 
Spinal cord injury (SCI) survivors. Fifty spinal cord injured participants were recruited 
by personal referrals within the Greater Boston area, social networking websites, an SCI online 
forum, and a national organization that puts out a monthly online newsletter addressing the 
concerns of people with disabilities. All recruitment materials directed interested participants to 
the web address of the SCI survey.  
Controls. Fifty control participants, i.e., people who were neither lottery winners nor 
spinal cord injured, were directed to the survey website examining “experiences of daily life,” 
through invitations posted on a social networking website (www.facebook.com), notices posted 
in the community, and flyers that were handed out in the Greater Boston area.  
Measures 
All participants were asked to indicate their gender, age, number of years of education, 
race/ethnicity, whether or not they were religious/spiritual, and whether or not they were in a 
long-term (defined as greater than 1 year) committed romantic relationship. The sample included 
people with different background characteristics to provide a stringent test of the hypothesis in a 
diverse sample. These general background variables were also collected so that they could later 
be included in analyses as covariates. 
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The spinal cord injury literature presents numerous reports of other factors that may 
influence post-injury well-being (Buckelew, Baumstark, Frank, & Hewett, 1990; Bulman & 
Wortman, 1977; Coyle, Lesnik-Emas, & Kinney, 1994; Krause & Sternberg, 1997). These 
include: time since injury, age at onset of injury, level of injury (tetraplegia versus paraplegia), 
completeness of injury (complete versus incomplete, an indicator of functional ability), and 
cause of injury. Thus, an additional questionnaire was included in the SCI survey to assess these 
characteristics. In addition, lottery winners were asked several questions specific to winning: 
amount won, year won, and the form in which they had chosen to accept the prize (i.e., annuity 
or lump sum). 
Participants were asked to rate three general happiness questions, on a scale from 0 = Not 
at all to 5 = Very much. First, they were asked, “How happy are you now (not at this moment, 
but at this stage of life)?” Second, “How happy were you before winning the lottery (for the 
lottery group), being spinal cord injured (for the SCI group), or 6 months ago (for the control 
group). Finally, participants were asked to rate how happy they expected to be in a couple of 
years. As a measure of the amount of happiness they derived from daily activities, participants 
were asked to indicate how pleasurable each of the following seven events was for them: talking 
with a friend, watching television, eating breakfast, hearing a funny joke, getting a compliment, 
reading a magazine, and buying clothes. Ratings were made on a 6-point scale ranging from 0 = 
Not at all to 5 = Very much. 
All participants were also asked to answer the rate the statements, "I think that spinal 
cord injury (paralysis) is" and “I think that winning the lottery is” on a scale from 0 = The worst 
possible thing that could happen in a lifetime to 5 = The best possible thing that could happen in 
a lifetime.  
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Procedure  
All recruiting materials contained a website address to each group’s respective online 
survey. To replicate Brickman et al. (1978) as closely as possible, control surveys mentioned 
only that the survey pertained to daily life, while the lottery winner and accident survivor surveys 
mentioned their special status. Study 2 of Brickman et al. demonstrated that using different cover 
stories for the surveys did not alter the interpretations of results. After reading informed consent 
and instruction pages, participants were asked to complete a battery of questionnaires that 
assessed aspects of psychological well-being. As an incentive for participation, a donation of $25 
to a charity of the participant’s choice was made for completing the questionnaire battery in full.  
Results 
Preliminary analyses   
One hundred and fifty participants took part in this study (50 participants in each group), 
with 45% of the people with spinal cord injuries, 46% of the lottery winners, and 65% of the 
controls being female. As in the Brickman et al. (1978) study, White participants held a 
consistent majority across groups, constituting 85% of the control, 71% of the SCI, and 87% of 
the lottery winner groups. About half of the controls (42%) and SCI participants (48%) 
responded that they were religious or spiritual, compared with 87% of lottery winners. Fifty-
seven percent of controls, 48% of SCI participants, and 73% of lottery winners indicated that 
they were in committed long-term romantic relationships. On average, the control group was the 
youngest (M = 34.33, SD = 9.91), followed by the SCI group (M = 44.00, SD = 13.00) and 
finally the lottery winner group (M = 55.83, SD = 14.86). This difference was significant, F(2, 
143) = 34.68, p = .000, ηp2 = .327. Total number of years of education also differed significantly 
across groups, F(2, 144) = 17.19, p = .000, ηp2 = .193. Controls had the most years of education 
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(M = 18.22, SD = 2.60), followed by the SCI group (M = 16.74, SD = 3.26) and the lottery 
winner group (M = 14.81, SD = 2.74). The ANCOVA analyses reported later include these 
background variables as covariates to account for the demographic differences between the 
groups, and for the possible confounding effects of these variables, as gender, age, education, 
race/ethnicity, religiosity, and relationship status have all reliably been found to be correlated 
with well-being (for a review, see Argyle, 1999). Please see Table 1.1 for correlations of 
demographic variables and happiness measures. In correlational and regression analyses, missing 
data were deleted listwise.  
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Correlation Coefficients for Demographic Variables and Happiness Measures in Study 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Gender: 0 = male, 1 = female; race/ethnicity: 0 = non-White, 1 = White; relationship status: 0 = not in a long-term (> 1 year) romantic relationship; 1 = in a long-term 
romantic relationship; religiosity: 0 = not religious or spiritual, 1 = religious or spiritual. Listwise N = 139. 
 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Present 
Happiness 
3.73 1.15 --            
2. Past  
Happiness 
3.41 1.40 .39*** --           
3. Future 
Happiness 
4.23 0.91 .61*** .28** --          
4. Daily  
Pleasures 
3.33 0.86 .39*** .17* .20* --         
5. SCI 
Worst/Best 
1.60 1.06 .15 .01 -.02 .05 --        
6. Lottery 
Worst/Best 
3.61 0.88 .09 .04 .04 .28** -.15 --       
7. Gender 
 
.51 .50 .20* .01 .11 .12 .13 -.04 --      
8. Age 
(years) 
44.22 15.09 .08 .07 -.21* .11 -.07 .12 -.06 --     
9. Race/ 
Ethnicity 
.83 .38 .13 .08 .16 .12 -.21* .15 .05 .04 --    
10. Education 
(years) 
16.73 3.19 -.00 -.08 .09 -.17 .23** -.16 -.02 -30*** -.08 --   
11. Relationship 
Status 
.60 .49 .28** .16 .10 .18* -.23** .21* -.10 .15 .13 -.12 --  
12. Religiosity .58 .50 .13 
 
.12 .04 .23** -.07 .07 .06 .30*** .07 -.29** .16 -- 
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At the time of their injuries, the spinal cord injured participants were, on average, 25.26 
years old (SD = 14.88), with an average of 18.50 years (SD = 12.62) since their injuries. Fifty-
five percent of participants were paraplegics, and 45% were tetraplegics. Forty-nine percent had 
complete injuries while 51% were incomplete. All were full-time wheelchair users. Fifty percent 
had been injured in car accidents, 12% had been injured in diving accidents, and the remaining 
38% were fairly evenly split between other sport and recreational activities, disease/illness, falls, 
gun violence, and other causes. For spinal cord injured participants, completeness of injury was 
correlated with daily pleasures, r(46) = .43, p = .002. An independent-samples t-test indicated 
that scores on daily pleasures were significantly higher for individuals with incomplete injuries 
(M = 3.75, SD = .66) than for individuals with complete injuries (M = 3.15, SD = .63), t(47) = 
3.29, p = .002. In addition, greater age at time of injury was associated with lower predictions of 
future happiness r(46) = -.43, p = .002 and less daily pleasures r(46) = -.33, p = .02. Length of 
time since injury, cause of injury, and level of injury (i.e., whether the person was a paraplegic or 
tetraplegic) were not related to any happiness measures. This latter finding is noteworthy, as 
intuitively, one would expect that injury level would be negatively related to happiness: the 
higher the injury is on the spinal cord, the less physical functioning someone has, creating an 
increase in resource demands (DeRoon-Cassini, Valvano, & de St. Aubin, 2009).  
Lottery winners had won an average of 6.01 million dollars (SD = 10.01) with a range 
from 1 to 55 million. On average, 8.02 years had passed since the event of winning (SD = 6.23). 
Seventy-four percent of winners had chosen to receive an annuity while 26% chose to receive the 
prize in the form of a lump sum. A greater number of years post-win was significantly associated 
with lower predicted future happiness, r(49) = -.44, p = .002, consistent with a habituation effect. 
The way in which the lottery winnings were awarded, that is, whether the winner received an 
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annuity or a lump sum, also had a statistically significant relationship with future happiness, 
r(50) = .33, p = .33), such that individuals who received lump sums expected greater happiness 
in the future (M = 4.92, SD = .28) than did those who received annuities (M = 4.27, SD = .96), 
t(48) = 2.40, p = .02. Amount won was not related to any measures of happiness.  
Analysis of Covariance 
General Happiness and Daily Pleasure.  Table 1.2 shows the estimated marginal means 
and standard errors for all happiness measures.  
Table 1.2 
 
Estimated Marginal Meansa (& Standard Errors) of Happiness Measures for each Group in 
Study 1  
 
 General Happiness Daily Pleasure 
 Present Past Future 
Control 3.62b (.19) 3.29b (.24) 4.02b (.14) 3.23b (.14) 
SCI 3.66b (.16) 3.70b (.21) 3.93b (.12) 3.52b (.12) 
Lottery Winner 3.94b (.20) 3.24b (.26) 4.78c (.15) 3.25b (.15) 
 
 
 SCI Worst/Best Lottery Worst/Best 
Control 1.56b (.17) 3.64b (.15) 
SCI 2.01b (.15) 3.58b (.13) 
Lottery Winner 1.20c (.18) 3.62b (.16) 
Note: SCI = Spinal cord injured. Means in the same column that do not share subscripts differ at 
p < .05 in a Bonferroni comparison. N = 150.  
 
aAdjusted for gender, age, education, race, religiosity, and relationship status. 
 
Perhaps most strikingly in that the finding is contrary to that of the original Brickman et al. 
(1978) study, an analysis of covariance revealed that there were no statistically significant 
differences between groups on the measure of present happiness, controlling for gender, age, 
education, race/ethnicity, religiosity, and relationship status (see ANCOVA results in Table 1.3).  
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Table 1.3 
 
Summary of Analysis of Covariance for General Happiness and Daily Pleasures in Study 1 
 
 Present Happiness 
Source SS df MS F ηp2 
Gender 9.38 1 9.38 7.90** .057 
Age 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 .000 
Race 0.80 1 0.80 0.68 .005 
Education 1.49 1 1.49 1.25 .010 
Relat. Status 13.32 1 13.32 11.22** .079 
Religiosity 0.32 1 0.32 0.27 .002 
Group 1.61 2 0.80 0.68 .010 
Error 154.43 130 1.89   
Total 2121.00 139    
 Past Happiness 
Gender 0.23 1 0.23 0.12 .001 
Age 0.02 1 0.02 0.01 .000 
Race 1.57 1 1.57 0.80 .006 
Education 0.25 1 0.25 0.13 .001 
Relat. Status 5.63 1 5.63 2.88† .022 
Religiosity 2.01 1 2.01 1.03 .008 
Group 5.34 2 2.67 1.37 .021 
Error 253.98 130 1.95   
Total 1886.00 139    
 Future Happiness 
Gender 1.37 1 1.37 1.99 .015 
Age 10.58 1 10.58 15.33*** .105 
Race 1.10 1 1.10 1.59 .012 
Education 2.05 1 2.05 2.97† .022 
Relat. Status  0.84 1 0.84 1.21 .009 
Religiosity 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 .000 
Group 12.80 2 6.40 9.27*** .125 
Error 89.75 130 0.69   
Total 2602.00 139    
 Daily Pleasures 
Gender 1.71 1 1.71 2.52 .019 
Age 0.01 1 0.01 0.04 .000 
Race 1.03 1 1.03 1.52 .012 
Education 0.53 1 0.53 0.79 .006 
Relat. Status  2.50 1 2.50 3.68† .028 
Religiosity 2.61 1 2.61 3.84† .029 
Group 2.21 2 1.10 1.62 .024 
Error 88.38 130 0.68   
Total 1646.27 139    
Note. Relat. Status = relationship status. Gender: 0 = male, 1 = female; race: 0 = non-White, 1 = White;  
relationship status: 0 = not in a long-term (> 1 year) romantic relationship; 1 = in a long-term romantic 
relationship; religiosity: 0 = not religious or spiritual, 1 = religious or spiritual. Listwise N = 139 
†p < 1.0. *p  <  .05.  **p  <  .01. ***p < .001. 
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Likewise, there was no statistically significant effect for past happiness by group, 
controlling for the six variables listed above. Again, this is in contrast to the findings of 
Brickman et al. (1978), in which the spinal cord injured participants exhibited what was termed a 
nostalgia effect, or a tendency to idealize the past. There was, however, a significant effect of 
group on predictions of future happiness. A Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparison of the 
difference between the future happiness of lottery winners and controls was statistically 
significant (p = .000), as was the Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparison of the difference 
between lottery winners and SCI participants (p = .000). The comparison of the difference 
between controls and SCI participants was not statistically significant (p = 1.00). In other words, 
while controls and SCI participants had similar estimates of their future happiness, both groups 
had lower estimates than did lottery winners. Finally, there was not a statistically significant 
difference between groups on ratings of daily pleasure. 
Best/Worst Events. The majority of participants in all groups rated wining the lottery as a 
highly positive event, with a mean of 3.61 on a scale of 0 to 5 (SD = .88), and, controlling for 
gender, age, education, race, religiosity, and relationship status, there were no between-group 
differences, F(2, 130) = .051, p = .95, ηp2  = .001. Contrary to popular press notions that winning 
the lottery may be more of a curse than a blessing because of additional problems that are 
created, such as strained social relations, lottery winners rated winning very highly relative to the 
best thing that could happen in life.  
Analysis of covariance showed a main effect of group on ratings of whether spinal cord 
injury is the worst or best thing that could happen in a lifetime, F(2, 130) = 6.74, p = .002, ηp2  = 
.094. Post hoc analyses using a Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparison indicated that lottery 
winners thought paralysis was significantly worse than did spinal cord injured participants (p = 
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.002) but not controls (p = .60). Ratings of controls were not significantly higher than those of 
SCI participants (p = .13). It is interesting to note that using 2.50 as a neutral point, 21, or 
approximately half, of paralyzed participants indicated that their spinal cord injury was closer to 
the best than the worst thing that could happen in a lifetime. Although most lottery winners rated 
winning highly and some spinal cord injured participants gave a low rating to becoming 
paralyzed, the majority of both sets of responses were not at the extremes. That is, participants 
could imagine events that were subjectively better than winning the lottery and worse than being 
disabled. Indeed, as was the case in the original study, correspondence with both winners and 
spinal cord injured individuals revealed that they believed that happiness was most associated 
with activities like interactions with loved ones and meaningful work. 
Study 2 
In Study 2, I sought to replicate and extend these results using new participant samples, 
so that I could both assess the robustness of these findings and examine additional questions. 
First, the same happiness measures that were used in Brickman et al. (1978) and in Study 1 of the 
current research were again administered to 25 participants in each of the lottery winner, spinal 
cord injured, and control conditions. Second, analyses of two different, psychometrically 
validated, measures of happiness were conducted. Finally, a measure that captures the 
eudaimonic, as opposed to hedonic, model of happiness was administered. 
Defining Happiness 
In the three decades since Brickman et al.’s (1978) seminal study was performed, and 
particularly since the growth of positive psychology in the past decade, a large body of literature 
has grown concerning the definition and measurement of happiness.  Subjective well-being 
(SWB), the term most commonly used in happiness research, divides happiness into two 
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components: emotional well-being and cognitive evaluations of life satisfaction. Emotional 
happiness refers to the frequency of the experience of two factors: high positive affect (e.g., 
excitement, enthusiasm, inspiration) and low negative affect (e.g., fear, guilt, anger). Cognitive 
happiness refers to a global sense of satisfaction with life. 
Research has shown these constructs are correlated, yet distinct (e.g., Diener, 1984). 
Using multitrait-multimethod matrix analyses Lucas, Diener, and Suh (1996) demonstrated that 
positive affect is discriminable from negative affect and that life satisfaction is discriminable 
from both positive and negative affect. These different components of well-being can move in 
different directions over time (Diener, Lucas, & Scollon, 2006). Positive emotions might 
increase at the same time as life satisfaction decreases, or positive emotions might decrease in 
tandem with negative emotions. Indeed, positive and negative emotions are only weakly 
correlated with each other (e.g., Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) and are correlated 
with different predictor variables. For instance, (Diener, Ng, Harter, & Arora, 2010) found that 
income is strongly associated with evaluations of life satisfaction but only modestly related to 
positive and negative affect. Further, some of the different factors that constitute happiness may 
be more subject to adaptation than others. For example, Lucas (2007a) found that although life 
satisfaction ratings of people with work-related disabilities did not adapt over time, emotional 
distress levels did. In other words, “happiness” cannot be defined as a unitary construct and is 
best assessed using multiple, multi-item measures.  
 In the second part of Study 2, happiness was divided into three factors, life satisfaction, 
positive emotions, and negative emotions in order to address the following question: Do the 
primary results from Study 1 (that is, no statistically significant differences between the present 
happiness levels of the three groups), hold for both cognitive and emotional happiness, or do 
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some components of well-being adapt more readily than others? To answer this question, the 
most widely used multiple-item subjective well-being scales, the Postive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and the Satisfaction with Life Scale 
(SWLS; Diener et al., 1985), were administered to the three groups of participants. The PANAS 
is internally consistent, stable over time, and has excellent convergent and discriminant 
correlations with lengthier measures of the underlying mood factors. The SWLS shows good 
convergent validity with other types of assessments of subjective well-being, and consistently 
has Cronbach’s alpha scores of about .80, which are considered reliable (see Pavot & Diener, 
1993, for a review). The use of multiple, multi-item, psychometrically validated measures of 
positive well-being is in contrast to the three prospective longitudinal studies of disability and 
adaptation conducted by Lucas (2007a), Oswald and Powdthavee (2008), and Pagan-Rodriguez 
(2010), which asked a single question, rated on a scale of 0 to 10: “How satisfied are you with 
your life, all things considered?” and Brickman et al. (1978) in which present happiness was 
assessed with the question “How happy are you now?” rated on a scale of 0 to 5. Indeed, when 
Lucas (2007a) conducted a second study in which he administered a measure of psychological 
distress along with the life satisfaction item, he found that adaptation levels differed depending 
on the measure used.  
 A further distinction was explored in Study 2. The above conceptualization of happiness, 
that is, low negative affect, high positive affect, and high life satisfaction generally depicts 
hedonia. As mentioned earlier, a second model of well-being, eudaimonia, has increasingly 
gained traction in the literature. A critical difference between the two models is the relationship 
of the state to its source. Hedonic pleasure is conceptualized as a state to be sought, regardless of 
the source, whereas the state of eudaimonia can be seen as a product of the pursuit of self-
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actualization. It is the virtuous activities that are the source of this latter form of well-being, 
rather than the well-being itself, that are the goal of human life. However, little attention has 
been paid to the implications of source differences on the occurrence, speed, and completeness of 
adaptation (Waterman, 2007). It is possible, for example, that happiness that is derived from 
using ones skills to overcome a challenge will not revert to baseline as rapidly as will satisfaction 
that is gained from material goods. These two forms of well-being, hedonia and eudaimonia, 
were measured to assess potential differences in adaptation effects.  
Method 
Participants  
Lottery winners.  Participants were 25 winners of at least $1 million from the Illinois 
State Lottery. As in Study 1, the Executive Director mailed a recruiting letter to approximately 
1,300 past winners, directing interested participants to an online survey link. The survey was 
closed after the desired sample size was reached.  
Spinal Cord Injured. The sample of 25 spinal cord injured individuals was recruited from 
an SCI online forum, and a national organization that puts out a monthly online disability 
newsletter, social networking websites, and by personal referrals from the greater Boston area. 
All recruitment materials directed interested participants to the web address of the SCI survey.  
Controls. Twenty-five control participants were recruited through invitations posted on a 
social networking website, notices posted in the community, and by handing out flyers in the 
Greater Boston area. 
Measures  
The first group of questions was identical to that used in Study 1. Participants were asked 
to specify various demographic characteristics, to rate their past, present, and future happiness, to 
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complete evaluations of daily pleasures, and to rate the events of acquiring a spinal cord injury or 
winning the lottery on a scale from the worst to best things that could happen in a lifetime. In 
addition, the three new scales described below were administered. 
Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmnos, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). The 
SWLS is a 5-item scale measuring global life satisfaction, the cognitive component of subjective 
well-being (α = .92). Respondents indicate the degree to which they agree with each of the 5 
statements, such as, “In most ways, my life is close to ideal.” Answer choices range from 1 to 7, 
anchored by strongly disagree and strongly agree. Responses are summed and scores range from 
5 to 35.  
          Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The 
PANAS is a 20-item questionnaire assessing emotional experience in general. Participants are 
asked to indicate on a 5-point Likert-type scale the degree to which they feel each emotion on the 
list on average. Positive emotions include excited, inspired, and determined, while negative 
emotions include afraid, irritable, and hostile. Responses are summed separately for the positive 
affect (PA; α = .92) and negative affect (NA; α = .90) scales (10 items each) and scores range 
from 10 to 50 for each scale.  
Psychological Well-Being Scales (PWB; Ryff, 1989). The PWB is an 18-item measure of 
eudaimonic well-being (α = .82). Respondents are asked to indicate the degree to which they 
agree with each statement, using a 6-point Likert response format. Response choices range from 
1 to 6 (0 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree). Scale items are both positively and negatively 
worded. The items constitute 6 subscales: (a) autonomy), (b) environmental mastery, (c) personal 
growth, (d) positive relations with others, (e) purpose in life, and (f) self-acceptance. 
Procedure  
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All recruiting materials contained a website address for each group’s respective online 
survey. The survey began with participants completing an online consent form and reading an 
instruction form. Participants then completed a battery of questionnaires assessing various 
aspects of well-being, including the three additional measures. As an incentive for participation, 
a donation of $25 to a charity of the participant’s choice was made for completing the 
questionnaire battery in full. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses 
As in Study 1, analyses reported later include important background variables as 
covariates as there were a number of demographic differences between the groups. Seventy-one 
percent of controls, 76% of spinal cord injured participants, and 67% of lottery winners were 
female. White participants again held a consistent majority across groups, constituting 64% of 
controls, 100% of SCI participants, and 92% of lottery winners. A larger percentage of lottery 
winners indicated that they were religious or spiritual (76%), compared with about half of the 
controls (56%) and half of the SCI group (48%). More controls (64%) and lottery winners (76%) 
indicated that they were in committed long-term romantic relationships than did participants with 
spinal cord injuries (44%). An univariate ANOVA revealed a statistically significant difference 
for age, F(2, 72) = 52.08, p = .000, ηp2= .591; lottery winners (M = 62.28, SD = 14.83) were 
older than both controls (M = 37.32, SD = 10.59) and SCI participants (M = 33.20, SD = 4.97), 
but controls and SCI participants were not significantly different from each other. A significant 
difference for years of education was also found, F(2, 72) = 5.49, p = .01, ηp2 = .132. Spinal cord 
injured participants (M = 15.84, SD = 1.82) did not differ from controls (M = 17.36, SD = 2.43) 
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or lottery winners (M = 14.80, SD = 3.66), but controls were significantly more educated than 
lottery winners. Missing data were deleted listwise in correlational and regression analyses. 
Spinal cord injured participants had been paralyzed for an average of 15.98 years (SD = 
5.09), with an average age at injury of 17.22 years (SD = 4.57).  All used wheelchairs full-time. 
Seventy-two percent of individuals had been injured in motor vehicle accidents, and the 
remaining 28% had a fairly even split between diving, other sports and recreational activities, 
disease/illnesses, falls, and gun violence. Sixty-eight percent of SCI participants were 
paraplegics and 32% were tetraplegics, with 36% having complete injuries and 64% having 
incomplete injuries. Greater time since injury was associated with lower reports of past 
happiness, r(25) = -.41, p = .04. This suggests that the longer someone had been injured, the less 
they tended to idealize the past. Cause, completeness, age at injury, and whether participants 
were paraplegics or tetraplegics were not related to any measures of happiness. 
For lottery winners, on average, 14.84 years (SD = 10.77) had elapsed since the event of 
winning, with an average prize of 5.92 million dollars (SD = 10.29) (range = 1 to 52 million). 
Seventy-two percent of winners received their prizes in the form of an annuity, while 28% chose 
a lump sum. Years post-win was negatively associated with present happiness, r(25) = -.45, p = 
.02, such that the winners were less happy the greater the amount of time that had elapsed since 
winning. Greater years post-win was also associated with less daily pleasure, r(25) = -.40, p = 
.05. Amount won and whether the award was received in the form of an annuity or lump sum 
were not related to any happiness measures.  
Analysis of Covariance 
General Happiness and Daily Pleasure.  As was the case in Study 1, an ANCOVA revealed 
that there was no statistically significant difference in present happiness between the three 
  
 55
groups, F(2, 61) = 0.76, p = .47, ηp2 = .024, controlling for gender, age, education, race, 
religiosity, and relationship status.  Also as found in Study 1, there were no significant 
differences between groups on ratings of past happiness, F(2, 61) = .78, p = .46, ηp2 = .025, 
further suggesting that, with time, spinal cord injured individuals ceased to idealize the past. In 
contrast to Study 1, in which SCI participants and controls were found to have lower predictions 
of their future happiness than did lottery winners, no such between-group differences were found 
in Study 2, F(2, 59) = .77, p = .47, ηp2 = .025. Also in contrast to Study 1, there was a statistically 
significant difference in the amount of daily pleasure experienced by the different groups, F(2, 
59) = 5.29, p = .01, ηp2 = .148, such that lottery winners (M = 4.01, SE = .23) reported higher 
daily pleasure than did SCI participants (M = 3.00, SE = .17), although not more than controls (M 
= 3.53, SE = .17). This is in striking contrast to the original Brickman et al. (1978) study, in 
which the daily pleasure ratings of lottery winners were significantly lower than those of 
controls, though not less than SCI participants.  
Best/Worst Events. An ANCOVA revealed a main effect of group on ratings of spinal cord 
injury as the worst or best thing that could happen in a lifetime, controlling for gender, age, 
education, race, religiosity, and relationship status, F(2, 61) = 4.20, p = .02, ηp2 = .121. Post hoc 
analyses using a Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparison indicated that lottery winners thought 
that paralysis was significantly worse than did control participants (p = .02) but not worse than 
did participants with spinal cord injuries (p = .27). The ratings of SCI participants did not differ 
significantly from control participants (p = .48). When using 2.50 as a hypothetical neutral point, 
more than half of paralyzed participants (14 of 25) indicated that their spinal cord injury was 
closer to the best than the worst thing that could happen in a lifetime. Analyses were not 
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conducted for the lottery Worst/Best measure because it was not administered to all groups in 
this study.  
Life Satisfaction and Emotional Well-being. Please see Table 1.4 for estimated marginal 
means and standard errors of the SWLS and the PANAS. An ANCOVA revealed that there were 
no statistically significant differences between groups on ratings of life satisfaction, controlling 
for gender, age, education, race, religiosity, and relationship status, F(2, 61) = 1.54, p = .23, ηp2 = 
.048 (Table 1.5). Similarly, no statistically significant differences between groups on positive 
affect ratings were found, F(2, 61) = 1.66, p = .20, ηp2 = .052. Finally, there were no statistically 
significant differences in negative affect between the three groups, F(2, 61) = .99, p = .38, ηp2 = 
.032.  
Table 1.4 
 
Estimated Marginal Meansa (& Standard Errors) of Subjective Well-Being Measures for each  
 
Group in Study 2  
 
Group Life Satisfaction Positive 
Affect 
Negative 
Affect 
Control 26.77b (1.66) 34.69b (1.88) 19.85b (1.71) 
SCI 23.44b (1.72) 35.78b (1.95) 18.06b (1.76) 
Lottery Winner 28.37b (2.28) 41.19b (2.58) 15.44b (2.34) 
Note: SCI = Spinal cord injured. Means in the same column that do not share subscripts differ at  
 
p < .05 in a Bonferroni comparison. Listwise N = 70.  
 
aAdjusted for gender, age, education, race, religiosity, and relationship status. 
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Table 1.5 
 
Summary of Analysis of Covariance for Cognitive and Affective Happiness in Study 2 
 
 Life Satisfaction 
Source SS df MS F ηp2 
Gender 166.14 1 166.14 3.20† .024 
Age 2.33 1 2.33 0.05 .000 
Race 114.40 1 114.40 2.20 .017 
Education 32.57 1 32.57 0.63 .005 
Relat. Statusa 167.50 1 167.50 3.23† .024 
Religiosity 0.15 1 0.15 0.00 .000 
Group 76.93 2 38.47 0.74 .011 
Error 67.47 130 51.90   
Total 93636.00 139    
 Positive Affect 
Gender 0.04 1 0.04 0.00 .000 
Age 14.25 1 14.25 0.26 .002 
Race 160.08 1 160.08 2.94† .022 
Education 93.85 1 93.85 1.72 .013 
Relat. Status 34.46 1 34.46 0.63 .005 
Religiosity 1.57 1 1.57 0.03 .000 
Group 34.89 2 17.45 0.32 .005 
Error 7080.81 130 54.47   
Total 209223.62 139    
 Negative Affect 
Gender 48.00 1 48.00 1.08 .008 
Age 88.95 1 88.95 2.00 .015 
Race 51.43 1 51.43 1.15 .009 
Education 1.32 1 1.32 0.03 .000 
Relat. Status  2.22 1 2.22 0.05 .000 
Religiosity 87.83 1 87.83 1.97 .015 
Group 0.13 2 0.06 0.00 .000 
Error 5795.81 130 44.58   
Total 51832.04 139    
Note. Relat. Status = Relationship Status. Gender: 0 = male, 1 = female; race: 0 = non-White,  
1 = White; relationship status: 0 = not in a long-term (> 1 year) romantic relationship;  
1 = in a long-term romantic relationship; religiosity: 0 = not religious or spiritual, 1 = religious  
or spiritual. Listwise N = 70. 
†p < 1.0. *p  <  .05.  **p  <  .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Eudaimonic Well-being. Table 1.6 displays the estimated marginal means and standard 
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errors of the Psychological Well-being (PWB) scales. Controlling for gender, age, education, 
race, religiosity, and relationship status, ANCOVAs revealed that there were no significant 
differences between groups on total PWB scores, F(2, 61) = 1.64, p = .20, ηp2 = .051, or on any 
subscale scores.  
Table 1.6 
 
Estimated Marginal Meansa (& Standard Errors) of Eudaimonic Happiness Scales for each  
 
Group in Study 2  
 
Scale Control SCI Lottery Winner 
Autonomy 14.00
 b (0.56) 15.00b (0.57) 15.10b (0.76) 
Environmental Mastery 13.76
 b (0.76) 14.12b (0.79) 15.18b (1.05) 
Personal Growth 15.39
 b (0.54) 16.30b (0.56) 15.68b (0.74) 
Positive Relatedness 14.08
 b (0.74) 14.44b (0.76) 15.74b (1.01) 
Purpose in Life 14.38
 b (0.60) 14.17b (0.62) 16.36b (0.82) 
Self-Acceptance 13.49
 b (0.74) 13.45b (0.77) 16.63b (1.01) 
PWB Total 85.08
 b (2.80) 87.47b (2.89) 94.68b (3.83) 
Note: SCI = Spinal cord injured. PWB = Psychological Well-Being scales. Means in the same  
 
column that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05 in a Bonferroni comparison. Listwise N =  
 
70.  
 
aAdjusted for gender, age, education, race, religiosity, and relationship status. 
 
Discussion 
The present research examined hedonic adaptation to extreme events.  In two studies, 
lottery winners, controls, and spinal cord injured participants were found to have no significant 
differences in their ratings of present happiness and past happiness, supporting the hypothesis 
that with increased time, adaptation would be complete.  Future happiness expectations varied 
slightly. In Study 1, lottery winners reported significantly higher estimates of future happiness 
than did controls and spinal cord injured participants, although this anticipation effect was not 
found in Study 2. Study 2 further confirmed the lack of between-group differences by 
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establishing that the similar happiness ratings were not products of the particular measures that 
were employed. Indeed, the relevant regressions were of similar magnitude when the SWLS 
(cognitive well-being) and PANAS (affective well-being) were substituted for the single-item 
measures used in the original study. Finally, a measure of eudaimonic happiness also showed no 
differences between groups.  
Thus, the findings of Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978) were only partially 
supported. Lottery winners were indeed no happier than controls, but in contrast to the original 
study, paralyzed individuals were not less happy than either controls or lottery winners. Further, 
lottery winners did not experience less daily pleasures than control participants as was the case in 
the original study (in fact, lottery winners reported greater pleasure from daily activities than did 
SCI participants in Study 2), and individuals with SCI did not exhibit a nostalgia effect by 
reporting greater past happiness than controls and lottery winners. Finally, results showed that in 
both studies, lottery winners, people with disabilities, and controls rated winning the lottery as a 
highly positive event and acquiring a spinal cord injury as a negative event, although the latter 
finding was more pronounced for lottery winners.  
According to adaptation level theory, happiness is always relative to the other stimuli to 
which it is compared. In the strong version of this view, people are doomed to remain on a 
hedonic treadmill (Brickman & Campbell, 1971); any gains in happiness will be followed by 
rapid adaptation back to one’s baseline set point (Kahneman, 1999; Lucas et al., 2004) through 
the processes of contrast and habituation. Conversely, any loss of happiness will also be 
ameliorated in time. In that the participants with paralysis did not differ significantly in their 
ratings of well-being, the pattern of findings in the present research falls more into alignment 
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with this theoretical framework than did Brickman et al.’s (1978) original study. That is, on 
average, everyone adapted.  
With respect to present happiness, as the primary difference between the findings of the 
current research and those of Brickman et al. (1978) pertained to the spinal cord injured 
participants, much of the following discussion will center on addressing the possible reasons for 
this discrepancy. It likely concerns two time-related factors. First, time since injury was greatly 
increased. Whereas the participants in the current research were, on average, almost two decades 
post-injury, the SCI participants in Brickman et al.’s study were specifically selected to be no 
more than 1 year post-injury, and all were still full-time residents in a rehabilitation facility. 
Thus, none had had the opportunity to reintegrate into their communities, re-establish social 
networks, nor return to their educational and employment pursuits. All of these factors have 
repeatedly been shown to increase well-being (e.g., Albrecht & Devlieger, 1999).  
Second, the historical time period differed. In the thirty-some years since the original 
study was published, much has changed with regard to disability rights and awareness. In the 
1970s, few laws prohibited discrimination on the basis of disability. The 1990 passage of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, and other landmark civil rights legislation, helped change this, 
and began to chip away at long-held discriminatory practices in education, employment, and 
other areas affecting civic engagement. Moreover, the difference in historical time has brought 
with it powerful changes in the conceptualization and definition of disability. At the time of the 
writing of the Brickman et al. (1978) study, a medical model of disability was predominant. This 
model portrays disability as a negative health-related problem of the individual, and therefore the 
onus for adapting to discriminatory attitudes, an inaccessible environment, and reduced 
opportunities for education and employment is placed on the individual (Albrecht & Devlieger, 
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1999). Unhappiness is considered to be inherent to disability itself (Bagenstos & Schlanger, 
2007). To the contrary, the contemporary social model of disability views disability as an 
interaction between the condition, the social context in which it occurs, and the environment. 
According to this model, it is these biases, rather than anything inherent to disability, that serve 
to lower the subjective well-being of some people with disabilities (Bagenstos & Schlanger, 
2007; Pagan-Rodriguez, 2010). Responsibility for adaptation is thus equally shared by the 
individual and by society. It is likely that an increase in the quality of life of people with 
disabilities has been made possible by these important time-related changes, and this may be 
reflected in the considerably higher ratings of present happiness that were found in the current 
studies.  
Although recent research by Lucas (2007a) presents a compelling case against complete 
adaptation in the case of disability, with findings that appear to contradict those of the present 
study, the generalizability of Lucas’s research is limited due to the definition of disability that 
was used. Respondents were selected for inclusion in analyses if they had been “officially 
certified as having a reduced capacity to work or being severely handicapped” (Lucas, 2007a; p. 
719), and were asked to rate the extent of their disability, from 0% to 100%. No other 
information about the nature of their disabilities was recorded. Thus, the defining feature of the 
participants was that they had been deemed, by government programs, to be incapable of work. 
This selection bias for individuals who had applied for and were receiving governmental 
disability benefits may have underestimated the degree to which adaptation occurs because it 
eliminated people who had successfully reintegrated into their professional lives. The population 
of people with work limitations is not fully representative of the broader population of people 
with disabilities. Many people with disabilities, even disabilities that are severe, do work. There 
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is considerable evidence that employment is associated with substantially higher physical, social, 
and psychological well-being and better quality of life for individuals with spinal cord injuries 
(Fadyl & McPherson, 2010; Hammell, 2007; Krause, 1992; McKee-Ryan, Song, Wanberg, & 
Kinicki, 2005). In the present research, no presumption about employment status was made, and 
thus both individuals who did not work and collected government disability payments, and those 
who did work, were included.  
Based on the results of Brickman et al. (1978), it could have been expected that the SCI 
participants would have demonstrated a nostalgia effect. In Brickman et al.’s study, SCI 
participants rated their past happiness as significantly higher than their present happiness, and 
significantly higher than did the lottery winners or controls. Brickman et al., posited that this 
tendency was produced by a sort of contrast effect. That is, by comparing the experience of daily 
activities with the pleasure brought by these events in their pre-injury lives, their past happiness 
served as a positive anchor, thereby serving to compromise their present happiness and 
experience of daily pleasures. However, in the present study, there were no differences in the 
ratings of past happiness, suggesting that the tendency to idealize the past may dissipate as time 
since injury increases. Following the reasoning of Brickman and his colleagues, this may have 
contributed to the higher present happiness and daily pleasure ratings of SCI participants found 
in the current study.  
Given that, in general, the best predictor of the future is the past (Janis & Nock, 2008; 
Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Webb & Sheeran, 2006), it is worth noting that participants in all 
groups predicted that their future happiness would be higher than their past and present 
happiness, producing another sort of contrast effect, an anticipation effect. That is, this contrast 
may have served to lower their evaluation of present happiness relative to the happier future that 
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they envisioned, a process called feedforward (Frederick & Loewnstein, 1999). I had 
hypothesized that, like present and past happiness, no significant differences between groups in 
anticipation effects would be found. This hypothesis was not supported in Study 1, as spinal cord 
injured and control participants endorsed significantly lower predictions of their future happiness 
than did lottery winners. It is possible that the lottery winners experienced greater optimism 
about their chances of encountering happiness-enhancing events in the future, due to their past 
experience of good fortune. However, this result was not found in Study 2, in which there were 
no differences in expectations of future happiness. 
 In Brickman et al.’s (1978) study, lottery winners reported experiencing significantly less 
pleasure from daily activities than did control participants. This result, they posited, was largely 
due to the experience of contrast effects. In contrast to the extremely positive event of winning 
the lottery, the pleasure they experienced from positive daily activities was diminished. 
Similarly, in contrast to the positive anchor of their pre-injury lives, the daily pleasure 
experienced by SCI participants was lower than controls, though this result was only marginally 
significant. In the present two studies however, these differences were not found (and in fact, 
lottery winners’ daily pleasure ratings were higher than those of SCI participants in Study 2). 
Using the framework of adaptation level theory, it can be postulated that with time, two 
processes may take place. First, the event with which current experiences are contrasted may 
shift. In the case of the spinal cord injured participants, it is possible that rather than using the 
positive pre-injury past as an anchor, the highly negative experiences closer to the time of injury 
may become more salient, thus creating a negative anchor in comparison to which current daily 
events seem more pleasurable. Second, the impact of habituation may overwhelm that of 
contrast, serving to diminish the effects of highly positive and negative past anchors. In other 
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words, the emotional experiences of recipients of either good or bad fortune were no longer as 
strongly influenced by comparisons with the past.  
Despite the lack of differences in most forms of happiness, the majority of participants 
rated winning the lottery as close to the best thing that could happen in life and SCI as close to 
the worst thing that could happen in life, although the latter finding was less pronounced for SCI 
participants. These affective forecasting errors, or mispredictions of the emotional impact of 
events, may be the norm rather than the exception. A large and consistent body of research has 
demonstrated that people are particularly bad at predicting their emotional responses to long-
term circumstances (Diekmann, Tenbrunsel, & Galinsky, 2003; Epley & Dunning, 2000; Wilson, 
Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). 
In a variety of contexts and populations, people display an impact bias, whereby they 
overestimate the intensity and duration of their emotional reactions to events such as being 
denied tenure, the break-up of a romantic relationship, or hearing about the death of a young 
child (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). Through overlooking habituation 
effects, people’s adaptation to events is underestimated. For example, people without disabilities 
consistently predict a lower life satisfaction than that actually reported by people with disabilities 
(e.g., Ubel, Loewenstein, Schwarz, & Smith, 2005; Ubel, Loewenstein, & Jepson, 2005), a 
robust phenomenon known as the disability paradox (Albrecht & Devlieger, 1999). This finding 
often holds true even for people who have a high level of contact with individuals with 
disabilities. For example, Gerhart et al. (1994) surveyed emergency care providers, finding that 
only 18% imagined that they would be glad to be alive with a high-level spinal cord injury, 
compared with 92% of individuals with SCI. Indeed, Brickman et al. (1978) reported their 
critical finding regarding the happiness of spinal cord injured participants in the following way, 
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“the accident victims did not appear nearly as unhappy as might be expected” (p. 921), which 
appears to be more a result of the researchers’ low expectations than the reality of the disabled 
participants. Although some researchers have proposed that this “happiness gap” may be due to 
scale artifacts or other well-being measurement issues such as scale recalibration on the part of 
the people with disabilities, empirical support for this speculation has been weak (Lacey et al., 
2008; Powdthavee, 2009; Ubel et al., 2005). Rather than capturing a surprising empirical finding, 
it is likely that this difference is due to systematic errors in the judgments of people without 
disabilities (Ubel, Loewenstein, & Jepson, 2005).  
Waterman (2007) suggested that adaptation research is incomplete without consideration 
of eudaimonic, as well as hedonic, conceptualizations of well-being. Competing hypotheses can 
be drawn from the well-being literature as to which of the populations represented in the current 
studies should have experienced higher levels of eudaimonia. On the one hand, Aristotle saw 
pleasure derived from extrinsic goals, including wealth, as detrimental to ones well-being (Ryan 
& Deci, 2001). Given this, it could have been predicted that gambling for and receiving a 
financial windfall could impede, rather than improve, ones level of well-being. With regard to 
adversity, a substantial literature documents reports of the resultant opportunities for growth and 
finding meaning in life, which are both critical components of eudaimonia. Perhaps, then, with 
regard to experiencing high levels of eudaimonia, acquiring a disability could be considered a 
boon and affluence a barrier. On the other hand, Ryff and Singer (2008) examined 
socioeconomic and life course correlates of well-being to illustrate that opportunities for 
eudaimonia are not evenly distributed. She posited that people with greater financial and 
educational resources have greater opportunities to maximize the opportunities presented in their 
lives, and thus greater access to eudaimonic well-being. Given this, the chronic stressors 
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associated with significant disability might overwhelm opportunities for growth and purpose, 
serving to lower eudaimonic well-being. In resolving this discrepancy, the present research was 
inconclusive; participants with disabilities’ scores on the measure of eudaimonic well-being were 
neither higher nor lower than those of lottery winners. Nonetheless, future research should try to 
tease apart the adaptation trajectories and timelines for the two different traditions of well-being.  
Limitations and future research 
The results of this study should be interpreted with caution for several reasons. The 
primary limitation of the present two studies is their small sample size. In particular, while it 
would have been desirable to have examined more than 75 lottery winners, gaining access to this 
population is intrinsically difficult. Importantly, however, it is not likely that these null results 
were the result of insufficient power, as several systematic differences were found between the 
general happiness ratings reported by various demographic groups. For instance, females 
reported significantly greater present happiness, as did individuals who were in long-term 
romantic relationships. Further, the sample sizes used in the present research were roughly 
double those used in Brickman et al.’s study (1978), in which several significant group 
differences were found.  
A second concern raised by Lucas (2007a; 2007b) is that demand characteristics may result 
in under- or overrepresentations of the impact of a life event on happiness. That is, asking 
directly about the effect of winning the lottery may artificially and temporarily inflate winners’ 
estimates of their happiness, or conversely, may deflate SCI estimates, simply because it makes 
the conditions more salient (Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999; Lehman, Wortman, & Williams, 
1987; Lucas, 2007b). Indeed, in a study of patients with Parkinson’s disease, patients reported 
lower life satisfaction when the study explicitly referenced Parkinson’s than when it did not 
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(Smith, Schwarz, Roberts, & Ubel, 2006). Following this reasoning, and given that both winning 
the lottery and acquiring an SCI were explicitly referenced in the respective surveys, differences 
in the results presented here would be expected to be even more extreme than was actually 
found. The second study conducted by Brickman et al. (1978), examined whether specifically 
mentioning that the study involved lottery winners would affect the happiness ratings of controls 
(versus using the “daily life” explanation). No differences were found, rendering it unlikely that 
the salience of lottery (or SCI) status impacted respondents’ ratings of general happiness or daily 
pleasures.  
Finally, a third limitation of these studies, and indeed of most hedonic adaptation 
research, is their cross-sectional design. Without prospective longitudinal research, several 
alternative explanations for the findings cannot be definitively ruled out. It is possible, for 
example, that there were pre-existing differences in the well-being of the different participant 
groups. A number of researchers have suggested that certain affect-inducing events are more 
likely to happen to certain people. For example, using data from their 8-year longitudinal 
Australian Panel Study, Heady and Wearing (1989) argued that a person’s baseline is due in part 
to their likelihood of experiencing good or bad events, and that unhappy people are more likely 
than happy people to experience bad events (and vice versa). Tyc’s (1992) study of children who 
had lost limbs due to accidents or disease further supports this contention, in that those children 
who had been injured in accidents had higher levels of pre-morbid psychological disorders. 
Thus, differences in happiness may precede events or even be the cause of events (Lucas et al., 
2004). If these findings were applied to the present research however, and individuals who 
acquire spinal cord injuries started with a lower baseline of happiness than did their non-disabled 
peers, we would have even more reason to expect to have found differences in the current 
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studies. Conversely, if the people who acquired SCIs were young, active, and athletic before 
their injuries and had higher than average happiness levels, then the current results would 
underestimate the decrease in happiness of these participants (Lucas, 2007a). 
To examine the impact of potential pre-existing differences in the case of lottery winners, 
Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978) conducted another study, in which they compared 
a sample of lottery players versus nonplayers. Results showed that not only were the 
demographic backgrounds between groups comparable, there were no significant differences in 
ratings of general happiness or daily pleasures. Gardner and Oswald also performed checks for 
pre-existing well-being differences in two studies of lottery players (2001; 2007), finding that 
players in general did not have average levels of well-being that were either higher or lower than 
nonplayers. Importantly, as individuals with lower incomes spend a higher percentage of their 
income on lottery tickets than do wealthier individuals (Haisley, Mostafa, & Lowenstein, 2008), 
Gardner and Oswald found that the psychological effects of winning occur independently of 
income (2001; 2007).   
 The design of interventions that propel more rapid adaptation to bad events & impede 
adaptation to good events is an area in which future research will be fruitful. Regarding the 
former, it will be important to investigate how, for whom, and in which domains adaptation is 
most likely to be complete after negative events. This will facilitate creation of faster, 
individually-tailored intervention processes that target those least likely to adapt (Boyce & 
Wood, 2011; Pagán-Rodríguez, 2010). Despite the strong tendency to return to baseline levels of 
happiness after positive events, several studies have demonstrated that it is possible to raise 
happiness levels for sustained periods of time. For instance, Fordyce (1977; 1983), performed 
several successful studies of a program designed to raise happiness levels, and these gains 
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persisted for over a year. In addition, interventions designed to increase thoughts of gratitude 
showed increased levels of positive affect (Emmons & McCullough, 2003), and Seligman, Steen, 
Park, and Peterson (2005) demonstrated the effectiveness of Internet-based interventions to raise 
happiness levels for up to 6 months. More recently, Sheldon & Lyubomirsky (2012) Sheldon and 
Lyubomirsky (2012) tested a model of “hedonic adaptation prevention,” finding that two largely 
independent pathways lead to sustained positive emotions from change-derived events. First, 
engaging with the object or experience (e.g., a new car or a promotion) in new and varied ways 
led to continued pleasure, and second, making efforts to savor, appreciate, and feel gratitude for 
the new circumstance prevented rapid adaptation to baseline levels of happiness. 
To conclude, I will return to the question posed by Brickman and his colleagues over 30 
years ago, “Is happiness relative?” They proposed that this conclusion could be drawn if 
happiness following extremes of good and bad fortune differed little. That is, rather than being 
an absolute entity of which some people have more and others less, it could be concluded that 
happiness is a relative construct that is constantly being measured by the individual against 
certain reference parameters, such as past experiences or future expectations. If this reasoning is 
sound, then the findings of the current research suggest that indeed, happiness is relative. 
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Abstract 
Socioemotional selectivity theory contends that as people recognize the inevitable constraint of 
time imposed by mortality, their goals change, motivating them to focus on emotionally 
meaningful aspects of life (Carstensen 1993, 1995). The broader cognitive implications of this 
shift have been explored, finding memorial mechanisms of older adults to be focused on 
maximizing positive information. Study 1 investigated whether traumatic life circumstances that 
did not limit the actual amount of time left in life would result in similar memory patterns.  
Forty-four young spinal cord injured individuals were examined using the same experimental 
paradigm as Charles and colleagues (2003), and results were compared with the young group of 
non-disabled adults from this study. Participants who had sustained a spinal cord injury were less 
likely than non-disabled controls to remember negative images and had relatively enhanced 
memory for emotionally-relevant images over neutral images. Study 2, an 8-year follow-up with 
the spinal cord injured participants, investigated the long-term implications of the memory biases 
found in Study 1. Regression analyses revealed that the lack of a negative memory bias at Time 1 
predicted less use of cognitive reappraisal as well as less posttraumatic growth, but did not 
predict improved well-being. 
Keywords: positivity effect, emotion regulation, posttraumatic growth, adversity, disability, 
spinal cord injury 
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Reduced recognition of negative stimuli predicts less cognitive reappraisal & posttraumatic 
growth after severe adversity: An eight-year longitudinal study. 
Contrary to stigmatized conceptions of old age, older adults often report high levels of 
well-being, placing increased emphasis on positive emotional experiences, significant 
relationships, and meaningful activities (e.g., Carstensen, 1993; 1995; Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & 
Turk Charles, 1999).  These changes have been shown to affect basic cognitive mechanisms and 
shift the type of information most likely to be attended to and remembered. Specifically, 
maintenance of positive affect with a corresponding decrease of negative affect is found 
(Carstensen & Mikels, 2005; Mather & Carstensen, 2005; Quinn, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004). 
   Like the conventional research on aging, research regarding the impact of traumatic 
events is largely negative and stresses loss and decline (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996). While these 
events often do produce predictable maladaptive responses that foster further problems (e.g., 
chronic depression and PTSD), particularly in the early stages, there is also evidence in the 
literature that indicates otherwise. A growing number of studies have documented reports of 
positive changes resulting from the psychological struggle with trauma and adversity (e.g., 
Affeck & Tennen, 1996; Helgeson, Reynolds, & Tomich, 2006; Ironson & Hayward, 2008; 
Linley & Joseph, 2004; McMillen, 1999; Park, 1998; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995; Zoellner & 
Maercker, 2005), including increased closeness to significant others, finding greater meaning in 
life, and a reordering of priorities such that greater emphasis is placed on emotionally significant 
activities. 
The outcomes endorsed in studies of the age-related memory biases are strikingly similar 
to those found in studies of positive growth following severe adversity. Taking these bodies of 
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research together, it seems reasonable to look for similarities in the associated cognitive 
processes. That is, can trauma trigger a reduction in negative memory biases?  
Socioemotional Selectivity Theory 
Socioemotional selectivity theory (SST; Carstensen, 1993; 1995), challenges 
conventional assumptions regarding aging by de-emphasizing losses, and focuses instead on age-
related improvements in emotional experience. According to SST, boundaries on time direct 
attention to emotional aspects of life, and this relates to aging as chronological age is linked to 
time left in life.  Thus, as people grow older, they increasingly regulate the emotional 
components of their lives, and therefore intellectual or knowledge-related goals become less 
important.  Emotional goals assume primacy and a more present-oriented state is adopted.  
Present orientation involves goals related to feeling states, experiencing emotional satisfaction, 
and deriving emotional meaning. Adopting this time orientation leads older adults to, for 
example, increasingly prefer interacting with emotionally close social partners instead of less 
familiar social partners (e.g., Fredrickson & Carstensen, 1990).   
The strategies of older adults appear to be quite effective at maximizing positive affect. 
For example, in an experience-sampling study performed by Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, and 
Nesselroade (2001), older adults were found to experience negative affect less frequently and for 
shorter durations than younger adults. The frequency of positive affect, on the other hand, 
showed minimal change over time (Charles, Reynolds, & Gatz, 2001). Studies examining social 
reasoning and decision making also suggest improved understanding of basic emotion states well 
into adulthood as well as better integration of emotion into cognitive processing (Blanchard-
Fields, 1986; Labouvie-Vief, DeVoe, & Bulka, 1989; Labouvie-Vief, Hakim-Larson, DeVoe, & 
Schoeberlein, 1989).  Numerous other studies have demonstrated that emotion-focused coping 
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and understanding advance with age (Diehl, Coyle, & Labouvie-Vief, 1996; Diener, Sandvik, & 
Larsen, 1985; Folkman, Lazarus, Pimley, & Novacek, 1987; Labouvie-Vief & DeVoe, 1991), 
and more effective emotion regulation strategies are adopted (Gross, Carstensen, Pasupathi, Tsai, 
& Gotestam Skorpen, 1997; Vaillant, 1977; 1993; 2002). 
Carstensen and colleagues (Carstensen & Turk-Charles, 1994; Charles, Mather, & 
Carstensen, 2003) have investigated whether the increased salience of emotional goals has 
broader implications, affecting basic cognitive mechanisms. Using an incidental memory 
paradigm, Carstensen and Turk-Charles (1994) explored the type of information older and 
younger adults remember about social interactions.  Participants’ recall for emotionally laden 
and emotionally neutral text was examined.  As a substantial literature documents age-related 
decrements in memory with age (Kliegl, Smith, & Baltes, 1989; Light, 1991; Salthouse, 1985), it 
was not expected that emotion memory would be superior in older relative to younger adults.  
Rather, it was expected that a memory bias favoring emotional material over neutral material 
would be apparent.  Indeed, each successive age group remembered proportionately more 
emotional material than nonemotional information from the narratives.  
Charles, Mather, and Carstensen (2003) have also tested memory for emotional and 
neutral images, further investigating the cognitive effects of increased salience of emotional 
goals. It was hypothesized that in order to be most effective at fulfilling emotional goals, one 
should have a heightened sensitivity to any emotionally relevant information in ones’ immediate 
environment. For optimal emotion regulation, one should be prepared to deal with negative 
information as well as embracing positive information.  More resources should therefore be 
devoted to encoding, rehearsing, and retrieving emotionally relevant information than 
emotionally neutral information.  
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Results confirmed these hypotheses.  For recognition memory, while younger adults 
showed a memory bias for negative images, middle-aged and older adults had relatively 
enhanced memory for both positive and negative images over neutral images. This cognitive 
shift is consistent with the idea that for optimal emotional experience, attention should be 
oriented towards both positive and negative information at encoding, and suggests that the 
increased salience of emotional goals leads to changes in the type of information that is most 
likely to be focused on and later remembered (Charles et al., 2003). 
Carstensen and Fredrickson (1998) have disentangled the findings of time left in life from 
chronological age, relative to socioemotional selectivity theory.  A sample of young men who 
were similar in age to one another, but differed notably in their health status (viz., HIV-negative, 
HIV-positive, asymptomatic, and HIV-positive, symptomatic) were studied with the same 
experimental paradigm as younger and older adults. With age held constant, increased closeness 
to the end of life was also associated with the increased prominence of affect in the mental 
representations of social partners. Results thus suggested that the perception of limited time, 
rather than chronological age, is the critical variable in the instigation of these cognitive shifts 
and challenges a purely developmental account of change (Carstensen & Fredrickson, 1998).   
Posttraumatic Growth  
 Studies of posttraumatic growth (PTG) have examined positive growth-related outcomes 
following such diverse experiences as breast cancer, HIV, airplane crashes, hurricanes, terrorist 
attacks, and bereavement (Linley & Joseph, 2004). Typical characteristics of PTG include 
experiencing greater meaning in life, a new appreciation for the fragility of life, and a reordering 
of priorities such that greater emphasis is placed on emotionally significant activities like 
spending time with loved ones (Tedeschi et al., 1998).  Indeed, some authors have argued that 
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experiencing these positive shifts is a central component of psychological recovery from 
traumatic events (Taylor, 1983; Yalom, 1980). Janoff-Bulman & Berger (2000) pointed out that 
people do not make such changes "in spite of their losses and sense of vulnerability, but because 
of them" (p. 39).  
   Like the research on aging and traumatic events, traditional research regarding the impact 
of disablement emphasizes loss and decline, and common stereotypes of living with physical 
challenges are largely negative (Wright, 1983). Traumatic-onset disablement often does produce 
maladaptive responses, particularly in the early stages (DeVivo, Black, Richards, & Stover, 
1991). However, there is also research on disability and other forms of health-related adversity 
that has documented levels of well-being that are higher than expected. For example, Sprangers 
& Aaronson (1992) found a tendency for health care providers and significant others to 
underestimate patients’ level of contentment as compared to patients’ self-reports. Andrykowski, 
Brady, & Hunt (1993) found that patients with a life-threatening disease or disability reported a 
stable quality of life (QOL), and other researchers found that individuals with a severe chronic 
illness reported a level of QOL that was not inferior to that of less severely ill patients or healthy 
people (Cassileth et al., 1984). 
Research specific to individuals with traumatic-onset spinal cord injuries (SCI), a 
disability that is most often permanent and seriously impacts most domains of life, has 
documented similar resilient outcomes. Silver (1982) reported that individuals with spinal cord 
injuries were very unhappy immediately following their injury, but that 58% stated that 
happiness was their strongest emotion by the third week after their injuries. Schulz and Decker 
(1985) studied adults with spinal cord injuries and found that despite the obvious impact their 
injuries had on them, participants saw themselves on average as being better off than most 
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people, with or without a disability. In addition, Diener and Diener (1996) reviewed studies that 
indicated that all American socioeconomic groups score above neutral on life satisfaction 
measures, as do people with this severe disability.  
As in the literature on aging, the appreciation of life’s fragility and greater awareness of 
mortality is a recurring theme in the literature on trauma and posttraumatic growth.  Although the 
actual amount of time left in the lives of individuals who have experienced life-altering traumas 
is not necessarily affected, the constraint of time imposed by mortality is made salient (Janoff-
Bulman, 1985; Lifton, 1976; see also Bower & Sivers, 1998). Janoff-Bulman contends that 
overwhelming life events force victims to confront their own mortality at a deep experiential 
level. As individuals’ fragility as physical beings becomes obvious through traumatic events, 
they are forced to recognize the real possibility of annihilation, of serious injury, and their own 
mortality (1985; 1992). Similarly, Lifton (1976) discusses the “death imprint,” or confrontation 
with one’s own mortality, as the defining feature of traumatic events, whether the victimizations 
are the result of natural disasters, diseases, criminal attacks, or serious accidents.  Being faced 
with the undeniable reality of the fragility of life forces people to reinterpret their world and 
themselves.  
The present research examined whether exposure to severe negative events could lead to 
enduring cognitive shifts away from negatively valenced stimuli. Most broadly, on the basis of 
the research on socioemotional selectivity theory and on posttraumatic growth, I predicted that 
the experience of significant disablement would alter the memory patterns of young spinal cord 
injured adults relative to their non-disabled peers. Using the same paradigm as Charles, Mather, 
and Carstensen (2003) to examine the role of emotion for memory of visual information, Study 1 
investigated whether the cognitive mechanism posited by socioemotional selectivity theory to 
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underlie the increased ability to regulate emotions in advanced age appeared in young adults with 
traumatic-onset spinal cord injuries. In Study 2, an eight-year longitudinal follow-up, I examined 
the long-term implications of these cognitive shifts.  
Study 1 
Study 1 examined the hypothesis that for recognition memory, young SCI adults would 
show decreased memory accuracy for negative images compared with their non-disabled peers, 
along with maintenance of memory for positive stimuli, as was the case with the middle-aged 
and older adults in the Charles et al. study (2003). This hypothesis is also consistent with 
previous findings that with age, negative affect is experienced less frequently (Carstensen, 
Paspathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Charles, Reynolds, & Gatz, 2001), and positive affect as 
often (Carstensen et al., 2000). Further, I predicted that young SCI adults would show a bias for 
emotionally-relevant stimuli as opposed to neutral stimuli, also as postulated by socioemotional 
selectivity theory (that is, positive and negative images would be recognized with equal 
accuracy, as was the case with the middle-aged and older adults in the Charles et al. study, and 
these emotional stimuli would be recognized with significantly greater accuracy than neutral 
stimuli).  
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-eight research participants were asked to take part in a study examining pictures 
of a variety of life experiences, and each received $50 for their participation.  Forty-four 
participants with spinal cord injuries (SCI), age 18 to 35 (M = 26.11, SD = 5.50) were recruited 
from personal referrals within Northern California, Southern California, and the Miami Beach 
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area.  This sample was matched with 441 young non-disabled (ND) adults, age 18 to 29 (M = 
24.52, SD = 2.87) from the Charles et al. study (2003), which was comprised of 22 White 
Americans and 22 Black Americans.  Racial composition of the SCI group was limited to White 
Americans due to reported difficulties in obtaining sufficient numbers of racially diverse spinal 
cord injured persons2. Because of the racial difference between groups, the original ND subjects 
were reanalyzed with race as a between-subjects factor.  No significant interaction of race by 
emotion was found for either recognition or recall memory, so subsequent analyses of the current 
study used the full ND group. The age range for SCI participants was extended by six years due 
to difficulties locating a sufficient number of young individuals who met inclusion criteria for 
this group. 
Fifty percent of each group was female.  Socioeconomic status (SES), as determined by 
the census index of occupations, was also split evenly; fifty percent of each group was blue-
collar, the remaining 50% was white-collar.  Sex and blue- or white-collar status were distributed 
evenly across age.  Finally, all spoke English fluently. 
Although the principal aim of the study was to measure memory for pictorial stimuli, 
physical health, verbal fluency, and spatial ability were also assessed since each of these factors 
may influence at least some features of emotional experience (Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & 
Nesselroade, 2000; McCrae & Costa, 1991; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989). These measures were 
necessary to ensure consistency between the SCI participants and the age-matched controls used 
                                                 
1
 Data collection for Study 1 was conducted in 2001 and the demographic information and experimental data 
presented for the non-disabled group reflect that which was collected by June 2001. The Charles, Mather, and 
Carstensen study was published in 2003; by that time four new participants had been added to their sample of young 
adults.  
 
2
 According to the Director of Rehabilitation Research at Santa Clara Valley Medical Center Traumatic Brain Injury 
and Spinal Cord Injury Model Systems of Care (the only Northern California SCI-specific facility), White 
Americans may be the only sub-population within this geographic area large enough to allow for statistically 
meaningful analyses (i.e., the SCI database contained only two Black American males that fit inclusion criteria, and 
no Black American females). 
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by Charles and colleagues (2003).  As can be seen in Appendix 1, the groups were similar in all 
domains measured.  
To increase homogeneity in the spinal cord injured group, all participants had sustained a 
spinal cord injury through traumatic onset (the result of a specifiable incident and onset), 
eliminating those who had acquired their disability at birth or through progressive disease. 
Individuals with traumatic onset spinal cord injuries have been found to have different mental 
health outcomes than individuals with nontraumatic lesions (e.g., Nielsen, 2003). Further, the 
SCI literature presents numerous reports of other factors that may influence post-injury emotions 
and cognitions (see, e.g., Buckelew, Baumstark, Frank, & Hewett, 1990; Bulman & Wortman, 
1977; Coyle, Lesnik-Emas, & Kinney, 1994; Krause & Sternberg, 1997; Krause, 1998).  These 
include: time since injury, age at onset of injury, level of injury (tetraplegia versus paraplegia), 
completeness of injury (complete versus incomplete, an indicator of functional ability), and 
attribution of blame for injury (self versus other).  These factors were represented and distributed 
across age as evenly as possible.  Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on the SCI data 
only, using each of these factors as a between-subject variable. None of the factors significantly 
interacted with valence for recognition memory accuracy, thus data were collapsed across all of 
the above factors for subsequent analyses.   
Measures  
 International Affective Picture System images (IAPS; Ito, Cacioppo, & Lang, 1998). A 
set of colored pictures depicting a wide variety of scenes that have been used and validated in 
many previous studies of human emotional response. These visual stimuli have been 
standardized on large normative subject samples to ascertain how pleasant/unpleasant (valence) 
the average individual feels when viewing each image (i.e., the conscious experience of 
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emotion). The IAPS provides emotional valence ratings for each image, ranging from 1 (most 
negative) to 9 (most positive) on a Likert-type rating scale. In addition, participants rated the 
emotionality of each slide at the end of the study to ensure that the categories were consistent 
between the groups included in this study. Results indicated no group differences in emotional 
ratings of the slides, and ratings were consistent with those published in the IAPS.  In total, 64 
images were used for this experiment; 32 were neutral and 32 were emotional (16 positive and 
16 negative). Each picture had a partner, matched on emotional valence and, when possible, 
similar in content. These were divided into two sets containing 32 images each (16 neutral, 8 
negative, and 8 positive). Despite the small number of images in each of the three groups 
(neutral, negative, and positive), the valence scores differed significantly from each other, 
F(2,24) = 503.98, p < .001. 
 Fifty-four of the 64 pictures chosen for this experiment came from the IAPS set.3 
Because emotional images often contain pictures of people, and neutral images do not, sufficient 
numbers of images that contained people but were neutral in emotional valence (i.e., had a rating 
which fell between 4 to 6 on the 9 point scale), were lacking. To control for this possible 
confound, 10 additional pictures were included in the neutral/person category. These slides 
included: people standing in line to buy sundries, a group of people sitting at the counter of a bar, 
and three people putting on scuba gear.4  Participants rated these images as neutral. 
 Within each emotion category, half of the images consisted of scenes including people 
and half were of animals, nature scenes, or inanimate objects.  Examples of the pictures 
                                                 
3
 IAPS image numbers: 1440, 1450, 1610, 1710, 1750, 2205, 2340, 2341, 2360, 2370, 2391, 2530, 2830, 2890, 
3220, 5001, 5200, 5830, 5831, 5910, 5920, 6560, 6570, 7000, 7006, 7009, 7025, 7031, 7060, 7100, 7130, 7150, 
7175, 7180, 7224, 7235, 7360, 7480, 7700, 7710, 7950, 8010, 8160, 9000, 9050, 9220, 9290, 9340, 9411, 9560, 
9611, 9622, 9630, 9700, 
 
4
 Additional pictures were people waiting in line at a fast food restaurant, farmers working in a field, a clothes 
market, people on a boardwalk, scuba divers, a crowd of people, and loggers working in a forest. 
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containing people included: farmers working in a hay field (neutral), people standing in front of a 
grave at a cemetery (negative), and a grandfather holding his two grandchildren (positive). 
Examples of object images included: a wooden stool (neutral), a cockroach on a piece of pizza 
(negative), and puppies in a basket (positive).  
 Wahler Health Symptoms Inventory (Wahler, 1973; α = .88).  A physical symptoms 
checklist that surveys type and frequency of 42 physical complaints.  Frequency ranges from 
never to every day, reflecting the daily experiences of subjective physical distress and not health 
status based on objective health measures or reported diagnosed conditions. The health 
continuum ranges from 0 to 4 (in which 0 indicates the very infrequent experience of physical 
symptoms and 4 indicates the frequent endorsement of physical symptoms).  It should be noted 
that because the inventory asks about symptoms, it is insensitive to medically controlled physical 
conditions and thus several items may have reflected SCI participants’ paralysis, rather than 
health per se. 
 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised (WAIS-R) Vocabulary Test.  A measure of 
verbal fluency, or the ability to comprehend and use language to express ideas (α = .81). 
Participants are asked to provide definitions for 30 words of increasing difficulty.  Answers are 
scored 0-2 based on sophistication of definition, as outlined in the WAIS manual. This test 
shows a strong relationship to general intellectual ability and has been used extensively with 
adults. 
 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised (WAIS-R) Digit Symbol Task.  A measure of 
spatial ability, in which numbers 1-7 are paired with symbols on a key presented to the 
participant (α = .87).  The participant has 90 seconds to go through a grid of 93 numbers and 
place the corresponding symbol below each number.  This measure assesses visual-motor speed 
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and complexity, and motor coordination. This test also shows a strong relationship to general 
intellectual ability and has been used extensively with adults.   
 Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John; 2003). A total of ten items 
assess the two emotion regulatory processes of reappraisal (6 items; α = .74) and suppression (4 
items; α = .75). Items include: “I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the 
situation I’m in” (reappraisal) and “I control my emotions by not expressing them” (suppression). 
In addition to these general-emotion items, the Reappraisal subscale and the Suppression 
subscale both include at least one item asking about regulating negative emotion (illustrated for 
the participants by giving sadness and anger as examples) and one item about regulating positive 
emotion (exemplified by joy and amusement). Items for each subscale are summed. 
 Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale Well-being subscale (CES-D WB; 
Radloff, 1977). The complete CES-D is a self-report scale containing 20 items that are 
symptomatic of depression, with high scores indicating a greater level of depressive 
symptomatology (α = .76). The CES-D Well-being subscale contains 4 items that are reversed-
scored and address general well-being, such as “I am happy” (α = .80). Respondents indicate the 
extent to which they experienced the symptoms over the past week. The CES-D WB was 
designed to avoid the problem of overemphasizing somatic items that frequently characterize 
nondepressed older people or people with disabilities (Schulz & Decker, 1985). 
 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). A 20-
item questionnaire assessing emotional experience in general. Participants are asked to indicate 
on a 5-point Likert-type scale the degree to which they feel each emotion on the list on average. 
Responses are summed separately for the positive affect (PA; α = .84) and negative affect (NA; α 
= .88) scales (10 items each) and range from 10 to 50 for each scale.  
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Procedure 
  Following initial screening to ensure that subjects met recruitment criteria for the project 
(e.g., traumatic onset of SCI), participants were interviewed individually for about one hour in 
the subjects’ home, a laboratory room at the Stanford University Psychology Department, or at 
another mutually agreed upon place. Given the mobility restrictions of this population, the 
former option was chosen in all but three cases, and all attempts were made to simulate a 
laboratory-like environment with minimal distractions.   
The experimental procedure was identical to that used by Charles and colleagues (2003). 
After obtaining informed consent and assuring participants that their responses would be 
confidential, participants were told that they would be observing images presented on a computer 
screen. An 11 by 8.5 inch computer monitor was placed approximately 1.5 feet in front of them. 
Participants were shown 32 consecutive images in random order, each remaining on the screen 
for three seconds interposed with a one second blank screen.  Of the 32 images, 16 were neutral 
and 16 were emotional (8 positive and 8 negative). Subjects were left alone, undisturbed, for the 
duration of the image set.  
 Following this initial image presentation, participants completed a demographic 
questionnaire, the vocabulary and digit-span subscales of the WAIS-R, and the Wahler health 
inventory, ERQ, CES-D Well-being subscale, and PANAS.  After 15 minutes, participants again 
sat in front of the computer screen and viewed 64 slides, half of which had been seen previously 
and half of which were novel. The images were presented in random order, and participants were 
asked to indicate whether or not they had seen each image in the previous set by pressing a key 
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on the keyboard that represented either a “yes” response or a “no” response5. After the 
participant had endorsed either a yes or no, the next image would appear. Again, participants 
with paraplegia, like the non-disabled comparison group, indicated their own responses, while 
participants with tetraplegia were asked to dictate their answers to the experimenter who then 
pressed the corresponding key.  When they were finished with this task, participants were 
debriefed, thanked, and paid $50.  
Results 
 Results first describe the calculation of recognition memory scores, then examine the 
relationship between group and valence of remembered images6. Scores were analyzed using a 
repeated measures general linear model with both between- and within-subjects factors. Group 
(non-disabled or spinal cord injured) was the between-subjects factor, and emotional valence of 
the image (positive, neutral, or negative) was the within-subjects factor.  
Recognition Memory 
  As in Charles et al. (2003), corrected recognition scores were calculated by subtracting 
the proportion of false alarms within each valence category (new images incorrectly identified as 
old divided by the total number of new images) from the proportion of hits within each valence 
category (old images correctly called old divided by the total number of old images). This 
corrected for possible response bias, that is, any participants’ propensity to identify all images as 
old, as well as for the larger number of neutral images.   
                                                 
5
 To control for response bias, the order of keys used to indicate “yes” versus “no” was reversed each time.  That is, 
22 participants used the “L” key to indicate “yes” and the “A” key to indicate “no,” while 22 participants used the 
opposite configuration. 
6
 Although Charles and colleagues (2003) analyzed their original data with a second within-subjects variable, people 
(that is, whether or not people were present in the picture), a significant difference was not found, and thus this 
variable was not considered in the current study. 
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To examine the effects of group on recognition memory for valenced images, a 2 X 3 
[Group (Non-disabled, Spinal cord injured) X Valence (Positive, Negative, Neutral)] repeated 
measures ANOVA was computed. As expected, there was no significant difference in the overall 
amount of pictures correctly remembered by SCI versus ND participants, F(1, 86) = .64, p = ns, 
MSE = .07. In line with the previous study by Charles and colleagues (2003), a main effect of 
valence was highly significant, with F(2, 172) = 17.76, p < .001, MSE = .10, ηp2 = .17. To further 
understand this effect, planned simple contrasts were performed. Overall, participants’ memory 
accuracy for negative pictures was significantly greater than that for either positive or neutral 
pictures (negative vs. positive: F(1, 86) = 10.51, p < .01; negative vs. neutral: F(1, 86) = 43.67, p 
< .001).  In addition, accuracy of memory for positive pictures was significantly greater than that 
of neutral pictures, F(1, 86) = 5.30, p < .05, suggesting that emotional pictures were better 
remembered in general.   Means and confidence intervals are provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Mean Proportions Of Correctly Recognized Positive, Negative, And Neutral Images, With 95% 
Confidence Intervals (CI) From Study 1  
Valencea Mean CI 
Positive .82 (.76, .89) 
Negative .88 (.82, .94) 
Neutral .79 (.73, .85) 
a
n = 88 (44 ND + 44 SCI). 
Results are illustrated in Figure 1. As predicted, the interaction of group by valence was 
highly significant, F(2, 172) = 5.12, p < .01, MSE = .06, ηp2 = .06. To further explicate this 
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interaction, a simple effects analysis was performed with SCI and ND participants considered 
independently.  For participants with SCI, recognition memory accuracy for emotional pictures 
(both positive and negative) was significantly greater than that for neutral pictures (positive vs. 
neutral: F(1, 43) = 24.67, p < .001; negative vs. neutral: F(1, 43) = 25.06, p < .001), but positive 
and negative pictures were remembered similarly (positive vs. negative:  F(1, 43) = .54, p = ns).  
For ND participants, however, recognition memory accuracy for negative pictures was 
significantly greater than that for positive pictures, F(1, 43) = 13.13, p < .01. Negative pictures 
were also recognized with significantly more accuracy than neutral pictures, F(1, 43) = 19.00, p 
< .001.  Memory accuracy for positive pictures did not differ from neutral ones (positive vs. 
neutral: F(1, 43) = .21, p = ns).  This supports the hypothesis that while young spinal cord 
injured individuals will show preference for emotionally relevant pictures over emotionally 
neutral ones at encoding, young non-disabled individuals encode negative content preferentially. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Proportion of correctly recognized slides (+ CI) as a function of group and valence of 
image, from Study 1.  n = 44 for each group. 
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Non-Disabled Spinal Cord InjuredP
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
im
a
g
e
s 
c
o
rr
e
c
tl
y
  
re
c
o
g
n
iz
e
d
Group
Positive
Negative
Neutral
  103
These results mirror the findings of the Charles et al. study (2003). While young adults 
recognized a higher proportion of negative images than positive or neutral (which were 
recognized with equal accuracy) in the recognition task, middle-aged and older adults performed 
similarly on the recognition task regardless of image valence. In fact, the SCI findings even more 
strongly supported the original prediction of socioemotional theory that emotional pictures 
would be recognized with greater accuracy than those that were neutral (in Charles et al., neutral 
stimuli were remembered with equal accuracy as emotional stimuli). 
Discussion 
As hypothesized, young adults who had experienced a traumatic spinal cord injury 
recognized a lower proportion of negative stimuli, in comparison with their non-disabled peers. 
Whereas young non-disabled adults showed a bias for recognition of negative images, young 
individuals with SCI recognized roughly the same proportion of emotional pictures versus 
neutral images as the middle-aged and older adults in the Charles et al. study (2003). This 
finding complements studies indicating that older adults, compared with younger adults, are 
engaging in cognitive processes that may mitigate the impact of negatively valenced experiences 
(Charles et al., 2003).  
 A common interpretation of found in the literature on socioemotional selectivity theory 
is that reduced memory for negatively valenced material (along with maintenance of memory for 
positively valenced material) functions as an emotion regulation strategy, helping to explain 
superior emotional well-being in older adults. However, a direct link between the age-related 
memory biases and well-being has not been explicitly empirically established (Isaacowitz & 
Blanchard-Fields, 2012). One of the aims of the second study was to test that link, that is, to 
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ascertain whether reduced negativity bias plays a direct role in emotion regulation and well-
being.   
 The theoretical basis for the original prediction that a negativity bias would not be 
present in the sample of young adults with spinal cord injuries drew on the construct of 
posttraumatic growth. Yet, to the best of my knowledge, a reduction in negativity bias and 
posttraumatic growth have never been empirically linked. Taking the socioemotional selectivity 
theory and PTG findings together, namely that the phenomena associated with the constructs are 
strikingly similar, the finding that the negativity bias is absent in young adults with SCI, and the 
findings of other researchers that PTG-associated changes are elevated in adults who have 
experienced traumatic events, it seemed reasonable to presume that there would be an association 
between the two findings.  
Study 2 
Study 2, a longitudinal follow-up conducted eight years later with the spinal cord injured 
participants, was designed to investigate several remaining questions: Does memory for negative 
stimuli have a relation to the use of emotion regulatory strategies in the future? Does the lack of 
a negativity bias relate directly to well-being? And, is there a relation between the memory 
biases and posttraumatic growth, as theorized? 
Although it was shown in Study 1 that young spinal cord injured adults did not show a bias 
for recognizing negative images, there was considerable variation in negative memory scores. 
Therefore, while negativity bias in Study 1 was calculated as a between-group interaction, in 
Study 2 it was represented as an individual difference variable, and analyzed within the SCI 
group only, thereby allowing examination of the long-term implications of having more or less 
of a negativity bias. 
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To assess emotion regulation, I measured the use of two common emotion regulation 
strategies -- cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression – using the Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003).  Cognitive reappraisal involves construing potentially 
emotion-eliciting situations in ways that change their emotional impact. For example, rather than 
viewing an exam as an anxiety-provoking reflection of ones’ worth as a student, one might view 
it as a chance to demonstrate the knowledge they have accrued over a semester of hard work. 
Expressive suppression is a response tendency that involves inhibiting emotion-expressive 
behavior (Gross, 1998). For example, one might refrain from showing negative emotion while 
watching a sad movie. In a series of studies, Gross and John (2003) demonstrated that people 
differ systematically in their use of these strategies, and that these differences impact both affect 
and well-being. In general, use of reappraisal is associated with greater experience and 
expression of positive emotion and lesser negative emotion, while use of suppression is 
associated with lesser experience and expression of positive emotion and greater experience of 
negative emotion. Overall, reappraisal is positively related to well-being whereas suppression is 
related negatively. 
Method 
Participants   
 After eight years, the original 44 adults with traumatic-onset spinal cord injuries from 
Study 1 were located and asked to participate in Study 2. Given the time lapse, this posed 
significant difficulties for locating participants due to changes in addresses, telephone numbers, 
and last names due to marriage and/or divorce. Intensive searches for current contact information 
were performed. These included contacting friends and family members using names that were 
collected during Study 1; past employers; an adoption agency; an address updating service 
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provided by Experian.com; gmail, hotmail, and yahoo email address identification services; 
social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, and Plaxo; online person locating 
sites such as 411.com and USSearch.com; and by calling directory assistance.  
 All 44 participants were located; one was no longer living, 25 had relocated within the 
state of California, and three were now living in other states. Following collection of potential 
contact information, multiple attempts to contact participants were made via postal mail, 
telephone calls, email, and the messaging functions of social networking sites. Of the 43 living 
participants, all agreed to take-part in Study 2. However, one individual did not complete the 
surveys and one participant failed to follow instructions, resulting in a final sample size of 41. As 
an incentive for participation, a donation of $25 to the Miami Project to Cure Paralysis, a leading 
program of spinal cord injury care and cure research, was made on behalf of each participant 
who completed the questionnaire battery.  
 The final group of 41 participants consisted of 21 women and 20 men. Individuals’ 
socioeconomic status remained largely the same as in Study 1 and was also roughly divided in 
half (20 blue-collar, 21 white-collar). Total education level had increased, as had the percentage 
of participants who were married or in other long-term romantic relationships. Age at Study 2 
ranged from 26 - 43 years (M = 34.10, SD = 5.50).  
 Be reminded that participants in the spinal cord injured group had also been selected for a 
number SCI-specific factors that increased homogeneity in this group and have been found in the 
spinal cord injury literature to influence various post-injury emotions and cognitions (see, e.g., 
Coyle, Lesnik-Emas, & Kinney, 1994; Krause & Sternberg, 1997; Krause, 1998). All 
participants had experienced traumatic-onset injuries and other key factors were represented and 
distributed across age as evenly as possible. The means, standard deviations, and counts for these 
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variables in the final sample of 41 participants are as follows: time since injury ranged from 9 – 
29 years (M = 15.06, SD = 5.34); age at onset of injury ranged from 3 – 33 years (M = 19.01, SD 
= 5.48), level of injury (21 tetraplegia, 20 paraplegia), completeness of injury (22 complete, 19 
incomplete), and attribution of blame for injury (21 self, 20 other).  With the exception of time 
since injury, for each individual, all factors were stable from Study 1 to Study 2. As in Study 1, 
analyses were performed using each of these factors as a between-subject variable. None of the 
factors significantly interacted with emotion regulation, and thus data were collapsed across all 
of the above factors for subsequent analyses.  
Measures   
 Participants completed an online survey battery consisting of several scales that were 
administered at Time 1, the ERQ Reappraisal subscale (α = .91), the ERQ Suppression subscale 
(α = .68), CES-D Well-being scale (α = .77), and PANAS (PA scale α = .89; NA scale α = .92), 
as well as the Posttraumatic Growth Inventory (described below). The health, vocabulary, and 
digit symbol tests were not readministered as these measures were included in Study 1 only to 
ensure consistency between the non-disabled and spinal cord injured samples.  
 Posttraumatic Growth Inventory (PTGI; Tedeschi and Calhoun, 1996). A 21-item self-
report measure of the perception of growth following extremely adverse events (α = .84). Scale 
items are all positively worded, and respondents are asked to indicate the degree to which each 
change occurred in their life as a result of their experience. A 6-point Likert response format is 
used, with response choices ranging from 0 to 5 (0 = I did not experience this change as a result 
of my crisis; 5 = I experienced this change to a very great degree as a result of my crisis). The 
items comprise 5 subscales: (a) relating to others (α = .82), (b) new possibilities (α = .73), (c) 
personal strength (α = .74), (d) spiritual change (α = .82), and (e) appreciation of life (α = .81).  
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Procedure 
  Participants were emailed an internet link to an online survey, created using the 
program SurveyMonkey.com. To ensure security of online answers, encryption technology was 
purchased. After a welcome message, survey instructions, and information about whom to 
contact in case of questions or concerns about the survey, participants were presented with an 
online consent form on which they selected “agree” in order to proceed to the questionnaires.  
After completing the measures, participants completed a general demographic questionnaire and 
an SCI-specific demographic questionnaire. A debriefing screen then appeared, explaining the 
full purpose of Studies 1 and 2. Participants with limited upper-extremity mobility were given 
the option of completing the survey by telephone; however, none accepted. Two participants 
were mailed hardcopies of the questionnaire packet and stamped self-addressed envelopes as 
they did not have access to the internet. Participants who did not complete the survey within 
three weeks were sent reminder emails and/or contacted by telephone.  
Results 
 
 Calculation of memory bias scores, as they pertain to Study 2, is explained below, 
followed by an examination of the relation between Study 1 memory scores and Study 2 emotion 
regulation, well-being, and posttraumatic growth scores.  
Calculation of Negativity Bias Scores  
As in Study 1 and in Charles et al. (2003), corrected recognition scores were calculated by 
subtracting the proportion of false alarms within each valence category (new images incorrectly 
identified as old divided by the total number of new images) from the proportion of hits within 
each valence category (old images correctly called old divided by the total number of old 
images). Study 2 memory bias scores were calculated by taking Time 1 corrected recognition 
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scores for negative images and subtracting Time 1 corrected recognition scores for positive 
images. This method of calculating Time 2 scores resulted in higher scores reflecting greater 
memory bias for negative images (relative to positive images), and lower scores reflecting less 
bias for negative images.  
Correlational Analyses 
 To lay a foundation for the Time 2 regression analyses that follow, I first calculated the 
bivariate correlations between Time 1 negative memory bias, and Time 1 emotion regulation and 
well-being variables (posttraumatic growth was not measured at Time 1). In this analysis, I 
calculated the negativity bias variable as described above. As shown in Table 2, negative 
memory biases were not associated with either emotion regulation strategy or any well-being 
variable. Consistent with the emotion regulation literature (e.g., Gross & John, 2003), cognitive 
reappraisal was associated with higher general well-being, and expressive suppression was 
negatively associated with general well-being and positive affect. 
 Table 3 displays the bivariate correlations between Time 1 negativity bias and Time 2 
emotion regulation, well-being, and posttraumatic growth. Surprisingly, at Time 2, negative 
memory biases were positively correlated with both reappraisal and suppression. Reappraisal 
was still associated with higher general well-being, as well as higher positive affect. Suppression 
was negatively correlated with general well-being. Finally, posttraumatic growth was associated 
with higher negativity bias and higher cognitive reappraisal.  
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Table 3 
 
Correlation Coefficients for Time 1 Negativity Bias and Time 2 Emotion Regulation and Well-
Being Variables 
 
Note. CES-D Well-being = Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale Well-being  
 
scale (CES-D WB; Radloff, 1977). N = 41. 
 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
In a linear regression analysis controlling for baseline cognitive reappraisal scores, higher 
negativity bias at Time 1 significantly predicted greater use of reappraisal 8-years later, B = 
16.02, β =.30, t(38) = 2.08, p = .04, ∆R2 = .09. Higher negativity bias at Time 1 also predicted 
more use of suppression 8-years later, to a marginally significant degree, B = 8.44, β = -30, t(38) 
= 1.91, p = .06, ∆R2 = .08. Indeed, when negativity bias was regressed on total emotion 
regulation strategy use, the result was significant, B = 23.50, β =.38, t(38) = 2.56, p = .01, ∆R2 = 
.12, revealing that people with higher negativity bias at Time 1 made greater use of emotion 
regulation strategies in general at Time 2.  
 Study 1 negativity bias did not predict higher overall well-being in Study 2. In a 
regression controlling for baseline CES-D Well-being scores, memory scores at Time 1 did not 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Negativity Bias 
(2001) 
.02 .16 --       
2. Cognitive   
Reappraisal 
(2009) 
29.44 8.40 .38* --      
3. Suppression 
(2009) 
12.27 4.44 .36* .08 --     
4. CES_D Well-
being (2009) 
8.93 2.82 -.16 .36* -.38* --    
5. Positive  
Affect (2009) 
36.63 6.38 .12 .46** -.08 .54** --   
6. Negative 
Affect (2009) 
19.05 7.39 -.05 -.26 .04 -.60** -.56**   
7. PTG (2009)  
 
75.71 16.66 .39* .55** .15 .11 .20 -.15 -- 
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significantly predict overall well-being at the follow-up assessment, B = -2.11, β = -.12, t(38) = -
0.78, p = .44, R2 = .13. Similarly, a regression controlling for baseline positive affect scores 
revealed that Study 1 negativity bias did not predict greater emotional well-being in Study 2, B = 
6.32, β =.16, t(38) = 1.03, p = .31, R2 = .12. Time 2 negative affect, controlling for Time 1 
negative affect, was not predicted by negativity bias scores either, B = -0.48, β = -.01, t(38) = -
0.09, p = .93, R2 = .45. 
 To test whether Time 1 negativity bias scores predicted Time 2 posttraumatic growth, I 
conducted a simple linear regression. Because the Posttraumatic Growth Inventory (PTGI) was 
not administered at Time 1, I was unable to control for baseline posttraumatic growth scores, and 
thus need to be cautious about making strong causal interpretations of the data. Higher Time 1 
negativity bias significantly predicted greater Time 2 posttraumatic growth: B = 41.18, β =.39, 
t(39) = 2.66, p = .01, R2 = .15.   
General Discussion 
The most striking finding of Study 1 was that participants with spinal cord injuries did 
not show a negativity bias in recognition memory for differently valenced images, in contrast to 
their non-disabled peers. Thus, the experience of severe adversity appeared to be sufficient to 
affect the amount of negative stimuli (relative to positive stimuli) that was remembered. This 
suggested that the increased salience of emotion that has been documented in the trauma and 
posttraumatic growth literature has a cognitive impact, leading to changes in the type of 
information that is most likely to be remembered.  
Socioemotional selectivity theory holds that a primary cognitive mechanism underlying 
the increased ability to regulate emotions in older age is decreased memory for negative stimuli 
along with maintenance of or increases in memory for positive stimuli (Charles, Mather, & 
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Carstensen, 2003). If this is the case, the memory biases may be expected to operate similarly 
among younger adults who have experienced traumatic disablement. However, at Time 1, no 
association between cognitive reappraisal and the number of negative images remembered was 
found, although the negativity bias was positively associated with expressive suppression. In 
other words, at Time 1, participants with lower negativity bias were not using an effective 
emotion regulation strategy more, they were using an ineffective emotion regulation strategy less.  
Results of Study 2 indicated that those spinal cord injured participants who exhibited a 
high negativity bias at Time 1 used reappraisal to a greater extent than those who recognized a 
lower number of negative images. Similar to Time 1, high negativity bias participants also used 
suppression at Time 2 more than those who had a low negativity bias at Time 1, to a marginally 
significant degree. That is, eight years later, participants with lower negativity bias were still 
using the ineffective emotion regulation strategy less than their peers with higher negativity bias, 
but they were also using the effective emotion strategy less. This suggests that although 
encountering significant life adversity relates to remembering a lower proportion of negative 
information, this also predicts less inclination in the future to use common emotion regulation 
strategies, both those that are effective and ineffective. 
It may be the case that the tendency for SCI participants to remember a smaller proportion 
of negative information than their non-disabled peers leaves them with less of a need to regulate 
their responses to such stimuli. This likely has both costs and benefits. In general, less memory 
for the negative information may be adaptive, and indeed less use of suppression has been found 
to be beneficial in affective and social domains. On the other hand, reduced use of reappraisal 
when confronted by negative stimuli may leave them vulnerable to future adversity.    
These studies also make important contributions to the posttraumatic growth literature. 
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Study 2 found that less negativity bias at Time 1 predicted less PTG at Time 2. This may appear 
to be counterintuitive as growth is generally conceptualized in positive terms. However, the PTG 
findings have been mixed, with some studies showing associations between PTG and measures 
of well-being, and other studies showing associations with forms of psychological disorders such 
as PTSD.  That a statistically significant relationship was found between the presence of negative 
memory biases and PTG would seem to support the latter camp. However, without further data, 
the present research is inconclusive on this point, as no direct associations between PTG and 
well-being were found. 
Another contribution of this research to the PTG literature regards one of the most 
contentious issues in this body of work: the phenomenon’s validity. That is, are people’s reports 
of positive change merely illusory attempts to feel good about oneself or are they reflective of 
veridical change? The findings from Study 2, that Time 1 negativity bias predicted greater Time 
2 posttraumatic growth, would seem to support the latter, in that evidence of a quantifiable 
change in memorial processes was associated with the phenomenon. This finding also suggests a 
cognitive mechanism that may underlie PTG. Importantly, this mechanism was present in 
participants without regard to gender, socioeconomic status, or the many SCI-specific 
characteristics that were measured. Future research should investigate whether this is the case 
across different stressor characteristics (e.g., type of trauma, severity) and despite the impact of 
specific cultural beliefs regarding growth.  
The literature on socioemotional selectivity theory often posits that age-related memorial  
and attentional biases lead to increases in well-being. However, Isaacowitz and Blanchard-Fields 
(2012) recently pointed out that the supposition that these cognitive processes are linked to the 
outcome of positive affective experience has not often been tested explicitly. The current 
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research attempted to test whether reduced negativity bias in recognition memory was directly 
related to improved well-being, as predicted by the SST research. Intriguingly, despite being 
related to emotion regulatory strategies, having a lower negativity bias at Time 1 was not 
associated with measures of general well-being, positive affect, or negative affect at Time 1, nor 
was it predictive of any of these measures at Time 2.  
 When held beside the emotion regulation findings of Study 2, however, this may not be 
surprising. Because reappraisal and suppression were both found to be elevated among those 
participants with higher negativity biases, it is possible that the effectiveness of one strategy was 
overwhelmed by the ineffectiveness of the other, thereby canceling each other out with regard to 
well-being. 
The lack of a connection between the negativity bias and well-being may also be 
understandable in light of the literature on socioemotional selectivity theory. A central 
theoretical tenet of SST holds that increased focus on emotionally meaningful goals is adaptive 
for older adults, for whom time left in life is limited, but not for younger adults whose futures are 
open-ended and thus best served by the acquisition of knowledge and a broad social network. 
Socioemotional selectivity theory therefore predicts that goals that are in accordance with ones’ 
stage in life will result in greater well-being, while goals that are not in accordance will not, a 
premise that was supported by this study.  
Indeed, Lang and Carstensen (2002) found that a preference for emotion-regulatory goals 
was associated with greater satisfaction only among those participants for whom these shifts 
were in alignment with their view of remaining time left to live. Other empirical findings also 
suggested that a premature focus on emotion regulatory goals would not be associated with well-
being in younger adults. For example, Fung and Carstensen (2006) found that shifts toward 
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emotionally regulatory social relationships were differentially associated with psychological 
well-being among younger and older adults. Subsequent to the 9-11 attacks and the SARS 
outbreak, greater salience of emotion corresponded with increased well-being for older adults, 
but did not for younger adults. Therefore, following the theoretical predictions and empirical 
findings of SST, it could be argued that less negativity bias, as experienced by the young SCI 
adults, did not predict greater long-term well-being because it was not adaptive for their stage in 
life.  
An alternative explanation for the lack of congruence between the memory shifts and 
well-being may be offered by the literature on trauma. An influential theory of trauma posits that 
the potency of traumatic events lies in their power to assault ones’ fundamental assumptions 
about the world and self. Beliefs about the safety and stability of life help one understand and 
cope with daily stress and the behavior of others.  Janoff-Bulman classified these core beliefs 
into three primary categories: (1) the world is benevolent, in both impersonal and personal 
domains, (2) outcomes in the world are distributed according to meaningful principles, e.g., 
justice, and (3) the self is worthy and deserves respect (1989).  These beliefs are difficult to alter 
substantially, as they are rooted in childhood and have been strengthened throughout life (Janoff-
Bulman, 1992).  Further, Bower and Sivers (1998) contend that this resistance to change is 
adaptive, as the conservation of these assumptions is essential for psychological health.  The 
intense emotionality and significance of traumatic events may not allow the victim to easily 
dismiss the traumatic experience despite these existing schemas, and the assumptions held by 
survivors may remain altered.  Therefore, there might be important differences in the type and 
consequences of outcomes that are associated with the natural aging process and those which are 
derived from confrontation with acute trauma. Indeed, Janoff-Bulman (1989) studied the 
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assumptions of individuals who had experienced traumatic events (including accidents resulting 
in serious disability) as compared to individuals who had not, and found that although 
respondents had experienced their victimizations many years prior to the study, they differed in 
assumptions representing each of the categories studied. Results of the study found that although 
the basic assumptions of victims did not reflect extremely negative views of themselves or the 
world, their assumptions were significantly more negative than for nonvictims, and victims were 
significantly more depressed.  A study by Lehman, Wortman, and Williams (1987) further 
supports the long-term impact of traumatic events.  The researchers assessed the mental health 
and functioning of individuals’ who had experienced the sudden death of a spouse or child 4 to 7 
years after the loss had occurred.  Compared to a group of matched controls, the group who had 
experienced the losses showed psychological symptoms of continued distress.  Lehman and 
colleagues concluded that traditional views of a timely resolution to bereavement were not 
supported; rather, findings suggested that exposure to extreme negative events results in 
enduring changes. Therefore, it is conceivable that the reduced negativity bias of spinal cord 
injured adults were overwhelmed by enduring changes in their protective assumptions, thereby 
preventing a corresponding increase in well-being, a possibility that warrants future exploration.  
 Another possible explanation for the lack of an association between the reduced 
negativity bias and well-being may lie in the burgeoning research on positive psychological 
constructs. This literature often divides types of well-being into two categories: hedonic well-
being and eudaimonic well-being (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2001; Keyes, Shmotkin, & Ryff, 2002). 
Hedonic well-being, the more common conceptualization of well-being, is pleasure-based, 
consisting of high positive affect and low negative affect. In contrast, eudaimonic well-being is 
based on meaning and self-actualization. These two types of well-being are associated with 
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different predictor and outcome variables, and are thus distinct yet related constructs (Ryan & 
Deci, 2001). 
 The distinction between these types of well-being was not often made at the time of 
Study 1. Not surprisingly, the two well-being outcome measures chosen for inclusion in the 
Charles et al. study (CES-D Well-being scale and PANAS), and therefore administered in the 
present two studies, were both measures of hedonic well-being. It is possible that the well-being 
of people who have experienced severe adversity, unlike that of the participants in previous 
studies, might be better assessed by eudaimonic as opposed to hedonic measures. Indeed, the 
significant relation between the negativity bias and posttraumatic growth hints at this. 
Posttraumatic growth often includes a greater sense of meaning in life as well as personal 
growth, both of which are also core aspects of eudaimonic well-being (Ryff & Keyes, 1995). It is 
conceivable then, that just as the negativity bias predicted PTG, it may have predicted a type of 
well-being that includes similar constructs. Further, cognitive reappraisal also shares an 
emphasis on personal meaning with both eudaimonia and PTG. Therefore, the absence of a 
relation between the lack of a negativity bias and well-being in Study 2 might be due to an 
inability of the hedonic measures that were used to capture the type of well-being experienced by 
spinal cord injured participants. In other words, in Study 2, I might not have been asking the 
correct question. Rather than asking if the reduction in memory for negative stimuli predicts 
well-being in younger adults who have experienced great adversity, it may be more informative 
to ask what type of well-being the reduction predicts.  
 Studies by Isaacowitz and colleagues point to several important directions for future 
research. In a study using eye-tracking to measure age-related attentional biases for positive 
versus negative images (Isaacowitz, Tone, Goren, & Wilson, 2008), findings suggested that 
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whether positive biases occurred depended on matching between layers of the emotion regulation 
process (e.g., attention, cognitive effort, emotional arousal) and dispositional cognitive 
reappraisal. Only among participants with a higher cognitive reappraisal level was older age 
related to less cognitive effort and/or emotional arousal toward the negative image compared 
with younger adults. This study also revealed that for younger adults, cognitive reappraisal was 
positively correlated with greater negativity bias (i.e., greater pupil dilation to negative images), 
while for older adults reappraisal was negatively correlated with negativity bias. In a second 
study (Li, Fung, & Isaacowitz, 2010), that measured age-related mood-congruency for gaze 
preferences, found that younger adults displayed mood-congruent looking patterns while older 
adults displayed looking patterns that were more consistent with mood regulation. Going 
forward, it will be important for research on memory biases for valenced material to measure not 
only age differences and differences regarding trauma history, but the interaction between 
emotion regulation strategies and layers of the emotion regulation process as well as the mood of 
participants when completing the information processing tasks.  
A final way in which the series of studies presented in this paper contribute to the 
literature is that it addresses the well-being of persons with disabilities. In the contemporary 
United States, some 54 million individuals—almost 20% of the population—have one or more 
physical, sensory, or cognitive disabilities (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 
2006), and half of these are severe, affecting the ability to perform basic life functions, such as 
walking, seeing, or hearing (CDC, 2006; Department of Health and Human Services, 2001). 
Further, on the horizon are the anticipated effects of the aging of the “baby boomer” generation, 
those born between 1946 and 1964, which will result in unprecedented numbers of older adults, 
including those with disabilities, living in the nation (Administration on Aging, 2001; Campbell, 
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1996b). According to the National Coalition on Disability and Aging, there are approximately 75 
to 85 million Americans -- or one-third of the nation -- who are aging with long-term disabilities 
or aging into disability for the first time in later life (Campbell, 1996b).  
 However, despite the increasing prevalence of older adults and people with disabilities 
and despite the significant challenges they face, remarkably little empirical research exists 
regarding the cognitive and emotional processes that are most effective for mitigating the impact 
of disability across the lifespan. Taken together, the research on memory biases, posttraumatic 
growth, and well-being suggest that cognitive changes, both positive and negative, are an 
essential component of emotional experience. Research regarding the emotional impact of 
disablement, like the study of aging, will lead to greater understanding of human behavior in its 
entirety.  
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Appendix 2.1 
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample 
Characteristic SCIa ND 
Age (years)   
     M 26.11 24.52 
     SD 5.49 2.87 
     Range 18-35 18-29 
Sex (%)   
     Male 50.00 50.00 
     Female 50.00 50.00 
SES (%)   
     Blue collar 50.00 50.00 
     White collar 50.00 50.00 
Race (%)   
     European American 100.00 50.00 
     African American 0.00 50.00 
Health (Wahler)b   
     M 1.65 0.79 
     SD 0.59 0.51 
Verbal Ability (WAIS-R)c   
     M 44.73 44.75 
     SD 11.62 13.02 
     Range 20.00-68.00 15.00-65.00 
Spatial Ability (WAIS-R)d   
     M 58.83 62.84 
     SD 12.64 13.22 
     Range 29.00-77.00 28.00-92.00 
Note:  ND = Non-disabled; SCI = Spinal cord injured; SES = Socioeconomic status.  Wahler =  
 
Wahler Health Symptoms Inventory; WAIS-R = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised,  
 
Vocabulary Test (Verbal ability) or Digit Symbol Task (Spatial ability).  Within the SCI group,  
 
the spatial ability task was only completed by paraplegics and high-functioning quadriplegics, N  
 
= 24, as the participant is required to write and thus needs full hand function.   
 
a
 n = 44 for each group. b Higher scores indicate greater level of health. c Higher scores indicate  
 
greater verbal ability.  d Higher scores indicate greater spatial ability.  
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Appendix 2.2 
 
Demographic Characteristics of the Spinal Cord Injured Group in Study 1 
 
Characteristic n = 44 
Level of injury (%)   
     Quadriplegic 50.00 
     Paraplegic 50.00 
Completeness of injury (%)   
     Complete 54.55 
     Incomplete 45.45 
Person responsible for injury (%)  
     Self 47.73 
     Other 52.27 
Time since injury (years)  
     M 7.01 
     SD 5.19 
     Range 1.00-21.00 
Age at injury (years)  
     M 19.26 
     SD 5.73 
     Range 14.00-32.50 
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Abstract 
When it comes to subjective well-being following challenging life circumstances, what 
matters more, material affluence or a sense of meaning in life? Two studies examined this 
question, using both longitudinal and cross-sectional data. Participants in Study 1, an eight-year 
longitudinal study, were 39 wheelchair-using adults with spinal cord injuries. At Time 1, 
participants were administered a survey battery in which they were asked to indicate their annual 
household income, as well as to complete measures of general well-being, depressive 
symptomatology, and positive and negative affect. Eight years later, participants completed an 
online survey that included these same measures. As hypothesized, multiple regression analyses, 
controlling for Time 1 levels of each well-being variable, as well as gender, age, education, 
health, religiosity, marital status, level of injury (tetraplegia or paraplegia), and time since injury, 
revealed that Time 1 income did not predict future subjective well-being on any measure. Study 
2 used a cross-sectional sample of 75 individuals with spinal cord injuries to test whether the 
absence of an income-happiness relationship replicated, and to evaluate the prediction that 
meaning would have a strong relation with subjective well-being. Participants completed an 
online battery of questionnaires that included a measure of meaning in life, general well-being, 
depressive symptomatology, and positive and negative affect. Multiple regression analyses again 
revealed that income did not predict any of the measures that were administered. Meaning, 
however, had a strong relationship; indeed, all subjective well-being variables were predicted by 
greater presence of meaning in life. 
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What makes life most worth living? More specifically, when it comes to well-being 
following challenging life circumstances, what matters more, money or a sense of meaning in 
life? We all know the axiom, “You can’t buy happiness.” However, the pursuit of financial gain 
is ubiquitous. We live our lives as though, indeed, money does matter. According to polls by 
Bloomberg.com, two-thirds of people would take a three-month vow of silence for $20,000. 
Twenty-five percent of people would abandon all of their friends and church for $10 million. 
And one in fourteen people would murder for that amount (Kanner, 2001).  
And perhaps money matters more in challenging times. Indeed, researchers (Kahneman 
& Deaton, 2010), found that the emotional strain of negative experiences, such as getting 
divorced or being ill, appear to be exacerbated by being poor. For example, among people with 
asthma, 41% of low earners reported feeling unhappy, compared with about 22% of the wealthier 
group. Angus and Khaneman wrote: "More money does not necessarily buy more happiness, but 
less money is associated with more emotional pain" (p. 16,492). 
There is also some evidence to suggest that in the case of acquired physical disability, 
which is the focus of the present research, money matters. Smith and colleagues (2005) found 
that participants who were above the median in total net worth reported a smaller decline in well-
being after a new disability than did participants who were below the median. They posited that 
financial resources could help people deal with the practical demands of disability, and served as 
a psychological buffer by minimizing the negative impact of physical declines. For example, 
affluence can facilitate better access to high-quality health care, accessible transportation, and the 
ability to make expensive home and workplace modifications. 
However, there is also research that draws this relationship into question. Using a cross-
sectional between-groups design, I recently repeated what has been called “most famous article 
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in the psychological literature on wellbeing” (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998), a study from the 
1970s that compared the happiness levels of lottery winners, people with paralysis, and controls. 
In the original study, lottery winners were no happier than controls, but both groups were much 
happier than the paralyzed participants. However, in my replication study, I made several 
important modifications, namely increasing the average time since injury from 1 year to 20 
years, and found that, with time, the paralyzed participants adapted and were no longer any less 
happy than the lottery winners (Hayward, 2012).  
Study 1 of the present research explores this discrepancy further, using 8-year  
longitudinal data to test the predictive ability of affluence on subjective well-being (SWB). Study 
2 incorporates the construct of meaning-in-life, testing the hypothesis that meaning matters when 
it comes to subjective well-being after significant life challenges.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-four participants with spinal cord injuries (SCI), age 18 to 35 (M = 26.11, SD = 
5.50) were recruited from personal referrals within Northern California, Southern California, and 
the Miami Beach area in 2001. Fifty percent of participants were female.  Socioeconomic status 
(SES), as determined by the census index of occupations, was also split evenly; 50% of each 
group was blue-collar, the remaining 50% was white-collar.  Sex and blue- or white-collar status 
were distributed evenly across age.  Racial composition of the SCI group was limited to White 
Americans due to difficulties in obtaining sufficient numbers of racially diverse spinal cord 
injured persons in the geographic areas in which recruitment took place. Finally, all spoke 
English fluently. 
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To increase homogeneity, all participants had sustained a spinal cord injury through 
traumatic onset (the result of a specifiable incident and onset), eliminating those who had 
acquired their disability at birth or through progressive disease. Further, the SCI literature 
presents numerous reports of other factors that may influence post-injury well-being (e.g., 
Buckelew et al., 1990; Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Coyle et al., 1994; Krause & Sternberg, 
1997).  These include: time since injury, age at onset of injury, level of injury (tetraplegia versus 
paraplegia), completeness of injury (complete versus incomplete, an indicator of functional 
ability), and attribution of blame for injury (self versus other).  These factors were assessed and 
included as covariates in regression analyses. 
After eight years, the original 44 participants were located and asked to complete the follow-up 
questionnaire. Given the time lapse, this posed significant difficulties for locating participants 
due to changes in addresses, telephone numbers, and last names due to marriage and/or divorce. 
Intensive searches for current contact information were performed. These included contacting 
friends and family members using names that were collected during Study 1; past employers; an 
adoption agency; an address updating service provided by Experian.com; gmail, hotmail, and 
yahoo email address identification services; social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, 
LinkedIn, and Plaxo; online person locating sites such as 411.com and USSearch.com; and by 
calling directory assistance. As an incentive for participation, a donation of $25 to the Miami 
Project to Cure Paralysis, a leading program of spinal cord injury care and cure research, was 
made on behalf of each participant who completed the questionnaire battery in full.  
 All 44 participants were located; one was no longer living, 25 had relocated within the 
state of California, and three were living in other states. Following collection of potential contact 
information, multiple attempts to contact participants were made via postal mail, telephone calls, 
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email, and the messaging functions of social networking sites. Of the 43 living participants, all 
agreed to take-part in the study. However, one individual did not complete the surveys, one 
participant failed to follow instructions, and two participants did not provide their income data, 
resulting in a final sample size of 39.  
 The final group of participants consisted of 20 women and 19 men. Individuals’ 
socioeconomic status remained largely the same as in 2001 (19 blue-collar, 20 white-collar). 
Total education level had increased, as had the percentage of participants who were married or in 
other long-term romantic relationships. Age at Time 2 ranged from 26 - 43 years (M = 34.10, SD 
= 5.50).  
 The means, standard deviations, and counts for the spinal cord injury-specific variables in 
the final sample of were as follows: level of injury (20 tetraplegia, 19 paraplegia), completeness 
of injury (21 complete, 18 incomplete), and attribution of blame for injury (20 self, 19 other).  
Time since injury ranged from 9 – 29 years (M = 15.06, SD = 5.34); age at onset of injury ranged 
from 3 – 33 years (M = 19.01, SD = 5.48). With the exception of time since injury, for each 
individual, all factors were stable from Time 1 to Time 2.  
Measures 
Most of the subjective well-being literature divides happiness into two components: 
emotional well-being and cognitive evaluations of life satisfaction. Emotional happiness refers to 
the frequency of the experience of two factors: high positive affect (e.g., excitement, enthusiasm, 
inspiration) and low negative affect (e.g., fear, guilt, anger). Cognitive happiness refers to a 
global sense of satisfaction with life. Research has shown these constructs are correlated, yet 
distinct (e.g., Diener, 1984). For instance, Diener, Ng, Harter, and Arora (2010) found that 
income is strongly associated with evaluations of life satisfaction but only modestly related to 
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positive and negative affect. Thus, measures of both affective and cognitive well-being were 
included in this study. 
Demographic characteristics. All participants were asked to fill out demographic 
information, including their annual household income. Income was measured using a scale from 
less than $10,000 to greater than $150,000, in $10,000 increments.     In addition, participants 
were asked to indicate years of education, whether or not they were religious/spiritual, and 
whether or not they were married. These factors have been shown to influence SWB in the extant 
literature (see e.g., Argyle, 1999), so they were later used as covariates in the regression 
analyses.  
 Affective happiness. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988) was administered to measure affective happiness in general. The PANAS is 
20-item questionnaire in which participants are asked to indicate on a 5-point Likert-type scale 
the degree to which they feel each emotion on the list on average. Responses are summed 
separately for the positive affect (PA; α = .92) and negative affect (NA; α = .90) scales (10 items 
each) and range from 10 to 50 for each scale.  
Cognitive happiness. The Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale Well-
Being subscale (CES-D WB; Radloff, 1977) was administered to measure cognitive life 
satisfaction. The CES-D is a self-report scale containing 20 items that are symptomatic of 
depression. The CES-D Well-Being subscale contains 4 items that are reversed-scored and 
address general well-being, such as “I am happy” and “I enjoyed life” (α = .80). Respondents 
indicate the extent to which they experienced the items over the past week.  
Procedure 
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At Time 1, after obtaining informed consent and assuring participants that their responses 
would be confidential, participants took part in a two-stage memory experiment that was part of 
a separate study. During the 15-minute break between experimental stages, participants were 
asked to complete a battery of paper-and-pencil questionnaires. Participants with limited hand 
function due to tetraplegia were asked to dictate their responses, which were recorded by the 
experimenter.  
 After Time 2, participants were emailed an internet link to an online survey, created 
using the program SurveyMonkey.com. To ensure security of online answers, encryption 
technology was purchased. After a welcome message, survey instructions, and information about 
whom to contact in case of questions or concerns about the survey, participants were presented 
with an online consent form on which they selected “agree” in order to proceed to the 
questionnaires.  After completing the measures, participants completed a general demographic 
questionnaire and an SCI-specific demographic questionnaire. A debriefing screen then 
appeared, explaining the full purpose of the study. Participants with limited upper-extremity 
mobility were given the option of completing the survey by telephone; however, none accepted. 
Two participants were mailed hardcopies of the questionnaire packet and stamped self-addressed 
envelopes as they did not have access to the internet. Participants who did not complete the 
survey within three weeks were sent reminder emails and/or contacted by telephone.  
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary correlational analyses of the relation between income, well-being, and other 
demographic variables were conducted to test for associations closer to the time of injury. That 
is, these analyses explored whether finances served to buffer the blow of traumatic injury. As can 
be seen in Table 3.1, annual household income was not related to any measures of SWB or any 
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demographic factor with the exception of physical health (greater income was associated with 
better health).  
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Table 3.1 
 
Bivariate Correlation Coefficients between Time 1 Demographic Variables and Time 1 Well-Being Measures in Study 1 
 
 
Note: PA = positive affect, NA = negative affect, CES-D WB = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Well-Being subscale, Tetra/Para = tetraplegic or paraplegic, 
Comp/Inc = complete injury or incomplete injury, Self/Other = who was responsible for the SCI, TSI = time since injury. N = 39 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001. 
Variable PA NA CES-D 
WB 
Income Gender Age Edu. Health Relig. Marital 
Status 
Tetra/ 
Para 
Comp/ 
Inc. 
Self/ 
Other 
TSI 
PA --              
NA -.55** --             
CES-D WB .59** -.59** --            
Income -.24 -.08 .15 -- 
 
          
Gender .06 .06 .02 -.08 -- 
 
         
Age .45** -.20 .44** -.01 -.13 --         
Education .27 -.20 .13 -.10 .07 .22 --        
Health .07 -.52** .15 .39* -.35* -.05 -.19 --       
Religiosity -.03 .20 -.14 -.18 .40* -.15 .34* -.14 --      
Marital St. -.03 .03 .28 .06 -.01 .11 .19 -.02 .00 --     
Tetra/Para .08 -.13 .07 .05 .44** .19 -.20 -.03 .11 -.32* --    
Comp/Inc .11 -.07 .25 -.03 -.23 .02 -.24 -.01 -.25 .13 -.18 --   
Self/Other .02 .03 -.07 -.15 .23 -.34* .17 -.26 .22 .11 .07 -.08 --  
TSI .33* -.28 .36* .08 .15 .49** .24 .25 -.01 .13 .06 .12 -.16 -- 
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Thus, close to the time of injury, money did not seem to serve as a psychological 
buffering factor as was suggested by Smith et al. (2005). On several measures of subjective well-
being, greater age and better health did appear to provide a buffer. Interestingly, there was also 
no relation between SWB and almost all SCI-related factors. For example, contrary to common 
assumptions, paraplegics were not happier than tetraplegics, and people with incomplete injuries 
were not happier than those with complete injuries. The exception to this pattern was time since 
injury: greater time since injury was associated with higher positive affect and greater general 
well-being, likely because the process of adaptation was at a more advanced stage. 
To test the hypothesis that higher income at Time 1 would not predict greater well-being 
at Time 2, I conducted multiple regression analyses, controlling for Time 1 levels of each well-
being variable, as well as gender, age, education, health, religiosity, marital status, level of injury 
(tetraplegia vs. paraplegia), completeness of injury (complete vs. incomplete), and time since 
injury. As revealed in Table 3.2, Time 1 household income did not significantly predict future 
subjective well-being on any measure.   
Table 3.2 
Summary of Regression Analyses for Time 1 Income on Time 2 Well-Being Variables in Study 1 
 
Variable  B SE B β t p 
Positive Affect 0.09  0.26 .05 0.33 .74 
Negative Affect -0.17 0.21 -.09 -0.79 .43 
Cognitive  
Well-being 0.16 0.10 .23 1.51 .14 
Note. Listwise deletion, N = 39. 
 
Study 2 
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If money doesn’t predict well-being after adversity, what does? Following in the tradition 
of Victor Frankl and his seminal writings on Logotherapy (1963), there is a growing literature on 
the importance of having a sense of meaning in life for adjustment to stressful life circumstances 
(see, e.g., Park & Folkman, 1997). Both theoretical work and empirical studies of positive 
sequelae following challenging events have burgeoned over the past two decades (e.g., Affleck 
& Tennen, 1996; Helgeson, Reynolds, & Tomich, 2006; Linley & Joseph, 2011; McMillen & 
Cook, 2003; Park, Cohen L.H., & Murch, 1996; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995; Zoellner & 
Maercker, 2006). In fact, while only a small percentage of people experience psychopathology 
after adversity, the majority of people report benefits and a high quality of life (Quarantelli, 
1985).  
Indeed, in the specific case of spinal cord injury, it has been found that although people 
who had sustained spinal cord injuries reported strong negative emotions 1 week after their 
accidents, only 7 weeks later they reported that their strongest emotion was happiness (Silver, 
1983). Further, Schulz and Decker (1985) studied adults with spinal cord injuries and found that 
participants saw themselves on average as being better off than most people, with or without a 
disability. Additionally, in a study of people with high-level tetraplegia by Gerhart and 
colleagues (1994), 92% of participants reported that they were glad to be alive and 86% of the 
group reported that they enjoyed an average or better than average quality of life. 
Based on the work of Janoff-Bulman (2002) and others, demonstrating that finding 
meaning is an important way in which individuals integrate challenging life events into their 
belief systems to reestablish a positive view of the world, I hypothesized that meaning would 
predict subjective well-being post-injury. Indeed, there is evidence that post-paralysis, following 
a period of increased attempts to make meaning, people shift their priorities from materialistic 
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goals to more meaningful ones, that meaning in life is a mediator of adjustment after spinal cord 
injury, and importantly, that the belief that ones’ life is meaningful is strongly associated with 
post-injury psychological well-being (Thompson, Coker, Krause, & Henry, 2003). Based on 
these findings, and the findings of Study 1, I used a cross-sectional sample of people with spinal 
cord injuries to test, first, the replicability of the lack of an income-SWB relationship, and 
second, the prediction that meaning would have a stronger association with SWB than would 
income. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-five7 spinal cord injured participants were recruited from personal referrals 
within the Greater Boston area, social networking websites, an SCI online forum, and a national 
organization that puts out a monthly online newsletter addressing the concerns of people with 
disabilities. All were full-time wheelchair users. The average age of participants was 44 years 
(SD = 13.00), 45% percent of participants were female, and 71% of participants were White. 
About half of the participants (48%) responded that they were religious or spiritual, 48% of 
participants were in committed long-term romantic relationships, and average years of education 
was 16.74 (SD = 3.26). All of the above variables were included as covariates in regression 
analyses. 
At the time of their injuries, the spinal cord injured participants were, on average, 25.26 
years old (SD = 14.88), with an average of 18.50 years (SD = 12.62) since their injuries. Fifty-
five percent of participants were paraplegics, and 45% were tetraplegics. Forty-nine percent had 
complete injuries while 51% were incomplete. Fifty percent had been injured in car accidents, 
                                                 
7
 Although 75 participants took part in this study, when listwise deletion was used in analyses, 15 of these 
participants were eliminated for not providing responses to one or more of the demographic questions that were 
entered as covariates. 
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12% had been injured in diving accidents, and the remaining 38% were fairly evenly split 
between other sport and recreational activities, disease/illness, falls, gun violence, and other 
causes. 
Measures 
 As in study 1, I assessed positive and negative affect with the PANAS, and general 
cognitive well-being using the CES-D Well-Being subscale. In addition, the following measure 
of meaning was administered. 
 Meaning. The Meaning in Life Questionnaire, Presence of Meaning Subscale (MLQ-P; 
Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006; α = .93) is a measure of the existence of general meaning 
and purpose in a person’s life. Respondents indicate the degree to which they agree with each of 
5 statements, such as “My life has a clear sense of purpose.” This measure has shown high test-
retest reliability as well as convergent and discriminant validity (Steger & Kashdan, 2006). 
Procedure 
All recruiting materials contained a website address to the online survey. After reading 
informed consent and instruction pages, participants were asked to complete a battery of 
questionnaires that assessed aspects of psychological well-being for people with spinal cord 
injuries. As an incentive for participation, a donation of $25 to a charity of the participant’s 
choice was made for completing the questionnaire battery in full.  
Results 
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to test whether subjective well-being was 
predicted by income and/or a sense of meaning. As Table 3.3 reveals, income did not predict any 
of the measures of SWB that were administered. It is also noteworthy that, as in Study 1, injury 
severity (whether one is a paraplegic or a tetraplegic), had no relation to subjective well-being. 
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Presence of meaning, however, had a strong relation to SWB. Indeed, all well-being variables 
were predicted by greater presence of meaning in life. 
Table 3.3 
Summary of Regression Analyses for Income and Meaning on Well-Being Variables in Study 2a 
 
 Incomeb                 Meaningc 
Variables B SE B β p B SE B β p 
Positive 
Affect 
0.09 0.31 .04 .77 0.70 0.11 .66*** .000 
Negative 
Affect 
0.13 0.27 .07 .62 -0.32 0.12 -.36* .01 
Cognitive   
Well-being 0.16 0.12 .19 .20 0.15 0.06 .36* .01 
Note. Listwise deletion, N = 60. 
aControlling for: gender, age, education, health, religiosity, marital status, level of injury (tetraplegia vs. 
paraplegia), completeness of injury (complete vs. incomplete), and time since injury. 
bAnnual household income.  
cMeaning in Life Questionnaire, Presence of Meaning subscale (MLQ-P). 
*p  <  .05.  **p  <  .01. ***p < .001. 
Discussion 
To date, most scientific research on psychological responses to adverse circumstances has 
focused on negative sequelae, such as depression, PTSD, and substance abuse. Common 
conceptions of trauma in general, and disability in particular, mirror this agenda. However, 
“exposure to stressful life events does not invariably end in depression and despair; it may also 
act as a catalyst for a reevaluation of one’s goals and priorities and a reexamination of one’s 
sense of self” (Bower et al, 1998, p. 984). Indeed, the findings of the present studies, in 
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conjunction with previous research, provide evidence for a link between subjective well-being 
and the presence of a sense of meaning in life following adversity.  
On the other hand, in contradiction to common conceptions regarding what will make one 
happy and the behaviors that result from these beliefs, a link between income and SWB was not 
found in either study. This is particularly noteworthy given the aforementioned literature that 
demonstrates a link between affluence and well-being in challenging life circumstances (e.g., 
Kahneman & Deaton, 2010; Smith et al., 2005). This discrepancy may be due to differences in 
measures used and populations examined.  
 The present research was not without limitations. In particular, the relatively small 
sample size necessitates using caution in drawing conclusions from the data, and findings should 
be considered preliminary. In addition, although a substantial number of potential demographic 
confounds were taken into account, it is possible that the observed findings may have been the 
result of other, unexamined psychological variables. Further, the generalizability of findings may 
be limited due to the nature of participants; middle-aged, White individuals constituted the 
majority of both samples. It is also true that findings cannot necessarily be generalized within the 
population of people with disabilities. To increase the homogeneity of the samples, individuals 
who had acquired their disability at birth or through progressive disease were not included; these 
types of disabilities may be associated with different emotional and cognitive processes. Finally, 
due to the cross-sectional nature of Study 2, causality cannot be addressed unambiguously.  
Despite these limitations, this series of studies adds credence to the growing literature on 
the importance of meaning, particularly after adverse life experiences. The consistent connection 
between well-being and the presence of a sense of meaning in life needs to be taken seriously in 
psychological interventions designed to ameliorate suffering after trauma.  Relatedly, in that 
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these interventions may promote attempts to find meaning after misfortune, future research needs 
to explore the process of searching for meaning. Evidence suggests that these two meaning-
related constructs, search and presence, have different relations to subjective well-being, with 
presence being positively correlated and search being negatively correlated (Steger et al., 2006).  
If this is the case, practitioners will need to proceed with caution during the first phase of 
meaning construction, perhaps providing additional support while an individual moves through 
this challenging process.  
Finally, on both an individual and societal level, it could be argued that priority shifts 
should be encouraged. Given that ones sense of well-being is not, or only weakly, related to 
material wealth and consumption, perhaps our use of time is misguided. The premium placed on 
the acquisition of financial affluence appears to run contrary to our own sense of well-being. 
That is, to answer the question with which I began this article, meaning matters more.  
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General Discussion 
 
Taken together, the three studies presented in this dissertation are loosely organized 
around the exploration of a central theme: well-being after disablement. This work was inspired 
by the burgeoning research on posttraumatic growth and the possibility for the positive that it 
invokes. Traditionally, the study of traumatic events has almost exclusively focused on negative 
sequelae, e.g., depression, substance abuse, and suicidality. The tide is turning however, and a 
broad base of empirical evidence now demonstrates that trauma can be associated with a wide 
variety of responses, including growth. Further, high levels of subjective well-being are not only 
possible following adversity, they may be the norm.  
The first paper provided a test of whether high well-being holds true even for people who 
have experienced significant disability, thus setting the foundation for exploring posttraumatic 
growth and related constructs. Of wheelchair-using adults with traumatic-onset paralysis the 
study asked, “Are they happy?” To provide an answer, two studies attempted to replicate the 
classic 1978 study by Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman on the relative happiness of 
individuals with spinal cord injuries, lottery winners, and controls. In contrast to the original 
study, when time post-injury was extended by two decades, no differences in happiness were 
found. This is remarkable given the current strong bias towards researching psychopathology 
post-SCI in the medical and rehabilitation literature, and suggests that a more balanced approach 
towards what is assumed and studied needs to be taken. Further, this study contributed to the 
current debate around hedonic adaptation, that is, whether adaptation is ubiquitous and complete, 
by suggesting that in both regards, it is.  
With the potential for high levels of well-being established, the second paper turned 
toward an examination of factors that may undergird this phenomenon.  Using an eight-year 
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longitudinal design, an examination of the emotion regulation abilities that underlie the positivity 
effect was presented. Relevant to the overall focus on posttraumatic growth in this dissertation 
were two findings: first, the result that Time 1 positivity effect scores significantly predicted 
Time 2 posttraumatic growth, would seem to support the validity of PTG in that it provides 
evidence of a quantifiable change in memorial processes that is associated with advances in 
emotion regulation abilities. Second, this finding suggests a cognitive mechanism that may 
underlie PTG, namely a reduction in memory for negative stimuli. Importantly, this mechanism 
was present in participants without regard to gender, socioeconomic status, or the many SCI-
specific characteristics that were measured. 
Paper 3 built on this exploration of posttraumatic growth by focusing on one critical 
component of PTG: a sense of meaning in one’s life. That trauma may act as a catalyst for a 
reevaluation of one’s priorities and a subsequent shift towards greater emphasis on those that are 
meaningful is critical to the PTG construct, and thus a special focus on it and its relation to 
subjective well-being seemed warranted. Indeed, the findings of the present studies, in 
conjunction with previous research, provide evidence for a link between subjective well-being 
and the presence of a sense of meaning in life following disablement. In contradiction to 
common conceptions regarding what will make one happy however, a link between income and 
SWB was not found in either of the two studies that made up this paper. 
Implications 
Finding evidence that contradicts current assumptions regarding the well-being of 
particular groups is important for several reasons. Errors in judgment about the well-being of 
others can have serious implications if translated into action (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998). A 
striking example of the deleterious consequences of these mispredictions is provided by a study 
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of emergency medical responders (Gerhart, Koziol-McLain, Lowenstein, & Whiteneck, 1994). 
Most responders incorrectly assumed that survivors of severe SCI would experience a low 
quality of life in contrast to the vast majority of participants with SCI, and almost a third of 
responders stated that these estimates of life quality should be a factor in determining the 
aggressiveness of life-saving efforts. A significant proportion of the emergency care providers 
reported that they would not opt for use of techniques aimed at saving their lives in the event of 
their own injury, reporting that death is preferable to life with a disability (Gerhart et al., 1994; 
Dunnum, 1990). In other words, there were associations between perception and practice: those 
with the bleakest outlooks of life after SCI were least likely to favor aggressive intervention.  
Moreover, underestimates of the capacity of individuals with disabilities to adapt can 
influence public willingness to endorse policies that will create greater well-being. If disability is 
thought to be an inherently negative life circumstance that results in permanently lowered life 
satisfaction, then it makes less sense to allocate scarce funds to interventions and assistive 
technologies aimed at improving quality of life. For instance, Bagenstos & Schlanger (2010) 
argue for reform to the legal practice of awarding hedonic damages to people with disabilities, as 
these awards are based on the presumption that disability inevitably lowers quality of life. They 
further argue that hedonic damage practices in the legal system encourage “pity and distract 
attention from societal choices that create disability” (p. 134). Evidence of the ability of people 
with disabilities to achieve high levels of happiness may help to impel reform of these practices. 
It is also important to note what is not implied by this research. Brickman & Campbell’s 
early work (1971), and much subsequent research, describes adaptation as inevitable. This, if 
true, does not bode well for attempts to raise well-being in individuals and society. But evidence 
for complete adaptation to disability, improved emotion regulation abilities, and a sense of 
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meaning does not mean that changes in social and economic policies relevant to disability are not 
necessary. Indeed, the World Report on Disability (WHO, 2011) reveals that of the more than 
one billion people in the world who have disabilities, 110-190 million encounter significant 
difficulties in their daily lives. Improvements in the quality of life of people with disabilities may 
serve to reduce the time required for hedonic adaptation and increase the possibility for growth. 
Limitations & Future Research 
Despite the contributions mentioned above, this research program is not without 
limitations. The two primary limitations of the present research, small sample sizes and the 
inability of cross-sectional designs to eliminate alternative explanations, have been discussed 
earlier and thus will not be repeated here. Another limitation of cross sectional studies, however, 
is that they may obscure individual differences in the speed and extent of adaptation because 
they explore between-group variation. There is considerable individual variation in the data, 
indicating that adaptation is not inevitable for all people. Indeed, Boyce & Wood (2011), using 
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP), found that adaptation to disability 
was significantly moderated by predisability personality. Over a 4-year period, people 
moderately high on the personality trait of agreeableness showed signs of complete adaptation to 
disability. In contrast, moderately disagreeable individuals had life satisfaction levels that were 
0.32 standard deviations lower than their more agreeable counterparts. Prospective longitudinal 
studies also permit the tracing of the temporal course of adaptation. Mancini, Bonanno, & Clark 
(2011) used latent growth mixture modeling to examine a subset of the GSOEP, finding that 
despite the general trend to maintain a stable level of happiness, there were multiple and 
divergent trajectories in response to marriage, divorce, and bereavement. Identifying the factors 
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that contribute to this variability is an important goal for future research (Lucas, Clark, 
Georgellis, & Diener, 2003; Lucas, 2007a).  
 Relatedly, averages obscure differences in adaptation to different domains of life. For 
example, although people may adapt completely in terms of global life satisfaction, adaptation 
may not be complete in all domains, such as health, income, work, and leisure. Pagan-Rodriguez 
(2008) found that although overall life satisfaction returned to pre-disability levels after about 5 
years, it was not complete in all domains measured, and different domains adapted at different 
rates. On average, leisure satisfaction returned to pre-event levels after 3 years, satisfaction with 
household income and housing took about 5 years, and health satisfaction never adapted. 
Similarly, Powdthavee (2009) found that complete adaptation occurred in all domains for 
individuals with mild disabilities, but for people with severe disabilities, adaptation in the health 
and income domains remained incomplete.  Future research that measures well-being in different 
domains of life will provide a more accurate and nuanced picture of the life satisfaction of people 
with disabilities.  
As only one type of disability was included in these studies, the generalizability of the 
findings may be questioned. However, disability is not a monolithic category. As Pagan-
Rodriguez (2010) points out, an important limitation in the few extant prospective longitudinal 
studies is that the data set (the German Socio-Economic Panel, GSOEP) does not permit 
disaggregated analysis by disability. Just as White, Black, and Asian participants, for example, 
cannot be assumed to have the same cognitive and emotional experiences, neither can people 
with different disabilities (and just as there is variation within ethnic categories, there are vast 
differences within each type of disability). For instance, individuals with psychosocial 
disabilities encounter the most negative societal attitudes and have the lowest rate of 
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employment; thus they might have lower probabilities of adaptation, a difference that would be 
obscured by averaging across disabilities (Pagan-Rodriguez, 2010). Therefore, although it may 
limit the generalizability of results, to provide the most stringent test of adaptation, different 
types of disabilities must be examined individually. Investigations of posttraumatic growth and 
different types of disabilities are rare; future research will be necessary to ascertain whether the 
findings in this paper are applicable to other groups of disabilities. 
Although concerns regarding the utility of using self-report scales to measure happiness 
are beyond the scope of this paper, it bears noting that high correlations have been found 
between self-reported life satisfaction and relevant measures, including length of life, sociality, 
extraversion, happiness of close relatives, skin-resistance measures of response to stress, risk of 
heart disease, sleep quality, memory measures, and electroencephalogram measures of prefrontal 
brain activity (Kahneman, & Krueger, 2006; Pagan-Rodriguez, 2010). Further, the ratings of 
clinical interviews, evaluations of close friends and family members, daily mood reports, and 
emotion memory test results, converge well with SWB scores (Pavot, Diener, Colvin, & 
Sandvik, 1991; Sandvik, Diener, & Seidlitz, 1993; Seidlitz & Diener, 1993). In addition, a high 
level of stability has been found in these correlations over time and across populations (Diener & 
Such, 2000). Indeed, leading spinal cord injury researcher Marcel Dijkers remarked, “the only 
relevant measure of quality of life is [a person’s] own judgment as to their well-being” (1997; p. 
829). 
 Finally, it will be important for future disability and posttraumatic growth research to 
take into account cross-cultural differences. In the current research, the samples were largely 
White and were drawn from a single Western nation. However, 80% of people with disabilities 
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live in developing countries, in which perceptions of disability are likely to vary. Although 
intended to apply to people from all cultures, such generalizability needs to be established.  
I will now bring this dissertation full circle by returning to the topic that inspired it, the 
general validity debate in the posttraumatic growth literature, and offer proposals for research 
that can further this important topic. 
Promising Directions for Future PTG Validity Research    
 Presence of cognitive processing variables. Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) have long 
argued that cognitive processing of, or deliberately ruminating upon, the impact of traumatic 
events on individuals’ lives is necessary for veridical growth to occur (Calhoun, Cann, & 
Tedeschi, 2010; Triplett, Tedeschi, Cann, Calhoun, & Reeve. 2011). There is growing evidence 
for this proposition. Bower et al. (1998) found that recently bereaved HIV-positive men were 
more likely to report growth and had lower mortality over 2 to 3 years if they showed evidence 
of cognitive processing. O’Cleirigh et al., (2003) found that while emotional expression (writing 
about a trauma) was good, cognitive processing was better. Participants whose essays about 
trauma showed evidence of positive cognitive appraisal change had better maintenance of CD4 
cells and better control of the HIV virus. In fact, cognitive processing mediated the relationship 
between emotional expression and the maintenance of healthy disease progression markers over 
2 years in a diverse sample of 135 people. Helgeson et al.’s (2006) review of 87 cross-sectional 
PTG studies showed that PTG was related to more intrusive and avoidant thoughts about the 
adversity. Experiencing intrusive thoughts about a stressor may be a sign that people are working 
through the implications of the stressor for their lives, and this process may then lead to growth. 
Indeed, it seems likely that a period of cognitive processing of the stressor may be necessary for 
growth to occur and it is difficult to imagine that true growth can occur within days of a 
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traumatic event. Future studies aimed at assessing the validity of self-reported PTG should 
incorporate this factor. 
The relations between cognitive processing, severity of event, and degree of positive 
change experienced as a result, should also be investigated further. Calhoun and Tedeschi (2006) 
concluded that greater stressfulness correlates with and can predict greater growth. That is, 
higher amounts of growth are generally reported by individuals who report higher amounts of 
stress or threat because they stimulate greater amounts of cognitive processing.  However, once 
the requisite threshold of stress has been reached to trigger the cognitive engagement necessary 
to produce growth, it is not clear whether the relationship between stress and growth continues to 
be linear. Several studies have suggested that, in some contexts, a curvilinear relationship exists 
between the traumatic “dose” and the growth response (Fontana & Rosenheck, 1998; Kleim & 
Ehlers, 2009; Linley & Joseph, 2004). Although very low doses of stress may not stimulate 
cognitive processing, extreme doses of stress may simply overwhelm people’s psychological 
resources (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2006), and thus the highest amounts of growth might be 
reported, and most valid, with intermediate amounts of stress. 
 Co-occurrence of positive and negative outcomes. Negative outcomes following a 
traumatic event and growth are not mutually exclusive; that is, posttraumatic growth and 
negative sequelae such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) may be distinct, independent 
constructs, rather than continuous dimensions. Indeed, study respondents often report co-
occurrence of highly negative states, such as PTSD, with PTG (Dekel, Ein-Dor, & Solomon, 
2011; Park, 1998; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004; Tedeschi & McNally, 2011), and this relationship 
can persist over decades (Holgerson, Boe, & Holen, 2010).  As PTG is prompted by events that 
are severe enough to challenge ones fundamental assumptions, these type of events are also 
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likely to cause more severe distress (Bower, Moskowitz, & Epel, 2009). Dohrenwend et al. 
(2004), suggested that there is a complex interplay between mental illness, such as PTSD, and 
positive growth processes that minimizes disability in postwar role functioning. They further 
suggest that this complicated mix of positive and negative appraisals may be the most adaptive 
outcome in that it reflects the reality of the experience yet provides an opportunity for growth.  
 Cheng et al.’s (2006) findings regarding people affected by the SARS outbreak, i.e., that 
people who reported benefits in the absence of costs scored higher on a test of social desirability, 
suggest that one promising way of distinguishing between illusory and veridical growth would 
be to assess the reporting of both costs and benefits in response to a stressor, with the 
endorsement of both being most likely to reflect true growth. If individuals report their positive 
experiences with equal accuracy as their negative experiences, this would seem to provide 
evidence for non-biased self-perception.  
Concluding Remarks 
 In addition to asking whether posttraumatic growth is illusory or veridical, it is important 
to answer another question: Why does it matter? There are several reasons for making this 
distinction.  First, to provide a comprehensive theory of trauma, it is necessary to have a 
thorough understanding of the sequelae, both negative and positive. Given all that is known 
about the negative consequences of trauma and adversity, researchers now need to learn why, 
when, and for whom, negative events sometimes lead to positive outcomes.  
Whether PTG is illusory or veridical also has implications for clinical interventions and 
practice. It is possible that there are subgroups within individuals who report growth; some may 
experience veridical growth outcomes while others do not, and the ones who experience veridical 
growth may be the ones who benefit most. It is also possible that in the period immediately 
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following the traumatic event reports of positive growth largely serve as coping mechanisms, 
whereas with increased time, real positive changes can occur in the person or in the person’s life 
(e.g., their relationships with others). That is, for some people, a period of palliative, illusory 
PTG may precede a subsequent period of actual transformative growth (Tedeschi & McNally, 
2011; Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). If it is found that these positive changes are in fact reflected 
in external reality, then it would be important to understand how they have come about so that 
processes of stimulating these changes in others may be developed (Park, 2009). To the extent 
that clinical work can foster the propensity to experience veridical growth, as opposed to the 
illusory sort, it would seem beneficial to be able to distinguish between the two.  
 I will conclude by putting forth the idea that posttraumatic growth research in general, 
and research concerning people with disabilities specifically, is not just interesting in an 
academic or intellectual sense; it has important implications for individuals and societies. 
Common assumptions that remain unexamined by the tools of science can be harmful, and 
providing a more balanced view of traumatic experience, one that includes the possibility for 
positive outcomes, may serve to enlighten conventional wisdom. If the assumptions regarding 
individuals who are facing challenges are incorrect, so too will be the policies, services, and 
mental health practices that grow out of these assumptions.  
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